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Analysis 
by 
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Supervisors: Gaute Torsvik (University of Bergen) and Magnus Hatlebakk (CMI) 
 
 
The last fifteen years, the fertility rate in Nepal has declined significantly. In the same period, 
the country has, despite political unrest and a civil war, experienced economic growth. Nepal 
has, contrary to its neighboring countries, India and China, not used legal action to limit its 
population growth. The fertility rate in Nepal is now below India’s rate, and is reaching the 
replace rate. In this thesis I explore the role of families’ wealth and female autonomy in 
determining individual fertility. Using cross sectional household data from 2006 I test the 
effect of wealth, female autonomy and other socioeconomic status on number of children. 
Except from wealth and female autonomy, emphasis is put on the strong preference for boys 
in the Nepalese society. Preference for boys is tested using gender of first child as a natural 
experiment. The theoretical foundation is based on Gary Becker’s work, where there is 
assumed a trade-off between the number of children and human capital invested in them. 
Ordinary Least Squares and Poisson Regression is applied, and the results are calculated and 
presented using STATA.   
 
My findings suggest that female autonomy is an important determinant of individual fertility; 
households where the husband has relatively more intra-household power get significantly 
more children compared to other groups. Wealth and education is also important 
  
determinants, but the effect of female education is only significant for low levels of education. 
Preference for boys is present, and this might have consequences, as sex-selective abortions 
are a potential threat when son-preferences are accompanied by decreasing fertility. 
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1.  Introduction 
In Nepal, the fertility rates are declining at an impressive pace. The country is among the 
large group of developing countries that experiences decreasing population growth. During 
the last fifteen years, there has been a reduction in the fertility rate from about five children 
per women to around 2.5 children, which is close to the replacement fertility rate. In other 
words, Nepal has managed to solve what is regarded a problem for many developing 
countries, high population growth.  
According to classical economic theory, population growth and economic development are 
closely linked. Thomas Malthus claimed in the eighteenth century that the size of a nation’s 
population always will be limited by economic resources and possibilities.  A more modern 
approach to fertility (represented for example by the work of Gary Becker) argues on the 
other hand that economic development will reduce the number of children. When a country 
gets richer, women will get better income possibilities and the cost of rising children (lost 
income) will increase.  This and the fact that improved economic conditions also 
implies better schools and better health system may induce families to reduce the number of 
children and use more resources on each child. Household members may, however, have 
different preferences over this Quantity- Quality trade-off.  In Nepal most of the decisions are 
made by men, on the other hand much of the burden associated with raising a family fall on 
the women.  The main objective with this study is to determine how family wealth and intra-
household power relations affect the fertility rates.   
The patriarchic nature of the Nepalese society is also represented through fertility preferences 
on another level; the preference for boys. An interesting question is how preference for sons 
affects fertility rates. Looking to other Asian countries, reduced fertility leads to an excess of 
boys because of sex-selective abortion.  Is this a concern in Nepal as well?  Using gender of 
the first born child as a natural experiment, I investigate to what extent gender-preferences are 
present in today’s Nepal. Other socioeconomic variables such as caste, occupation, marriage, 
and family planning indicators are also tested. 
Exploring these effects, I use household data from Nepal, 2006. Individual fertility is 
regressed on a number of variables.  The fact that the independent variable (number of 
children) is a count variable violates key assumptions behind the OLS regression method. 
Hence, I apply Poisson Regression as well as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in my analysis. 
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Both have advantages and disadvantages, however, their results are found to be nearly 
identical. 
I find that wealth is significantly correlated with fertility for most levels, and that both 
husband’s and wife’s education level is affecting number of children. The effect is largest for 
low levels of wealth and female education. Regarding male education, the effect is most 
important for high levels. Female autonomy is a significant determinant for fertility, most 
notably is that the families with the lowest level of female autonomy get significantly more 
children than other groups. Boy preferences are definitely an issue in Nepal. The natural 
experiment clearly indicates that families where the first child is a girl get more children, 
compared with families whose first born child is a boy. The results are stronger when the 
gender of the two first children is used. 
Initially, the thesis launches a discussion of population growth in a general context, its 
relationship with economic development, and the case of Nepal. The background chapter also 
describes my fieldwork, carried out in Nepal last year. I continue with the theoretical 
framework, a chapter containing a historical outline of population economics theories, a 
simple outline of the Becker-Model, and some insights into the relationships between female 
autonomy and fertility. Methodology and hypotheses follows, before I present my findings. 
The most important conclusions from my empirical analysis are presented in the findings 
chapter, while the thesis is summed up with a discussion regarding future challenges. 
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2. Background 
Falling fertility is on the agenda throughout the world. In Europe, the declining population 
growth and the ageing population causes concern about the future of the welfare states, while 
the same trend in developing countries is regarded as good news because high population 
growth usually is seen as closely linked with low economic and human development. 
This chapter presents some contemporary issues related to population in the developing world 
and Nepal in particular. In addition to this, my fieldwork, carried out in October and 
November 2009 is summarized. In the fieldwork part I take a deeper look at fertility patterns 
in Nepal, fertility preferences, and norms, based on my experiences. Finally, boy-preference, 
its consequences for fertility and the potential consequences it can have for the society is 
sketched. 
2.1 Population 
The Economist stated the following on its front page in October 2009: “Falling Fertility – 
How the population problem is solving itself” (The Economist 2009). This sentence captures 
at least three interesting points; Falling Fertility, Population problem and Solving itself. 
 “Falling fertility” 
 In the developing world, fertility rates are declining rapidly. A look at the World Bank 
statistics shows the following development in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)1
 
: 
Region 1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
East Asia & The Pacific 
 
2,62 
 
2,16 
 
2,01 
 
1,96 
 
Europe & Central Asia 
 
2,30 
 
1,85 
 
1,61 
 
1,62 
 
Latin America & The Caribbean 
 
3,23 
 
2,89 
 
2,66 
 
2,36 
 
Middle East &  North Africa 
 
4,89 
 
3,85 
 
3,21 
 
2,89 
 
South Asia 
 
4,29 
 
3,87 
 
3,45 
 
3,08 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
6,29 
 
5,93 
 
5,59 
 
5,30 
 
World 
 
3,26 
 
2,91 
 
2,72 
 
2,59 
Source: The World Bank (2010)  
The general pattern in Table 1 is that fertility is quite dramatically declining in most parts of 
the world. This in itself is interesting to study, as it has affected and will affect countries and 
                                                 
1 TFR is expected total births per women if she lived through all her fertile years. 
Table 1: Total Fertility Rate in selected Regions & the World.  
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families throughout the world in the years to come. The population composition is interesting 
in itself, but not least because population and economy are interconnected. The labor market, 
the education level, technology of production and migration are all affected by and affects the 
population composition and size through both aggregate and individual effects. 
“Population Problem”  
The heading implies that we are dealing with a problem, more specifically a problem 
concerning the population; we are too many people. Partly is this a question of total resources, 
partly about the allocation of resources, and partly a normative question. Whether we are too 
many or not, are not my main concern and are definitely outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, most of the population growth is taking place in parts of the world where the 
resources are scarce. A climate crisis and a resource crisis are frequently being predicted and 
more people means more resources needed. What happens when every Chinese wants a car? 
is a typical rhetorical question being asked to symbolize the challenges ahead. Everyone 
deserves the same standard of living as we have in the industrialized countries, but it is 
difficult to see how it can be delivered with the resources available. Owning a car is one thing, 
but more important for millions of households are the more basal needs of everyday life, such 
as food on the table and safe drinking water.  
What is the optimal number of children for a family? From a community’s stock of resources 
point of view, the answer to this question can be “few”. From a family’s point of view, which 
needs some extra pair of hands to contribute to the family economy, the answer can be “quite 
a few”. Families like this might contribute to a population growth that is potentially a threat 
for the already pressured resource foundation in the community. Most would however agree 
that constraining the family’s choices regarding their own family is an inappropriate 
interference into the private sphere2
 “Solving itself”  
. If there is a population problem, is there a solution? 
Or at least; being solved. The scope here is that, population growth is the problem and the 
falling fertility is the solution. Socioeconomic analyses of fertility have been carried out in 
many countries, with different angles and across various academic disciplines. In economics, 
the usual way to begin is by assuming that there is a trade-off between quality and quantity of 
                                                 
2 Even though  some countries , China in particular, has implemented policies to limit family size. 
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children3
 
. The trade-off implies that when people, due to different reasons, want higher 
quality children, the cost of raising children increases, making parents substitute from many 
children to fewer children while investing more in each. The theoretical foundations, 
including the outline of the Quality-Quantity Model is presented later. 
Region Pop. growth  
(annual  
percent) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
East Asia & The Pacific  1,60 1,25 0,93 0,81 
 
Europe & Central Asia  0,64 0,10 0,09 0,07 
 
Latin America & The Caribbean 
  
1,85 
 
1,68 
 
1,47 
 
1,24 
 
Middle East & North Africa 
  
3,43 
 
2,10 
 
1,94 
 
1,87 
 
South Asia 
  
2,10 
 
1,89 
 
1,79 
 
1,56 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
  
2,81 
 
2,69 
 
2,64 
 
2,50 
 
The World 
  
1,70 
 
1,47 
 
1,30 
 
1,19 
 
The World (Total Population) 
  
5 278 893 731 
 
5 689 010 289 
 
6 084 911 264 
 
6 466 751 511 
         Source: World Bank (2010) 
As seen from Table 2, the problem is indeed getting “solved”. The population growth is 
declining (the population is of course still increasing, however only barely in Europe), and 
declining fertility is the main reason.  
Falling Fertility and Population Growth 
Population growth is the relationship between how many people are added to the population 
and how many leave the population, births relative to deaths. The less developed countries 
usually have high birth and death rates. The death rates normally decline at some point in the 
development process followed by a drop in fertility. This is described as the demographic 
transition theory and will be investigated further in the theory chapter.  
There is an important difference between the birth rate, which is directly linked to the 
population growth, and the fertility rate which is an individual measure. A high fertility rate 
does not necessarily cause high population growth, because the age distribution dimension in 
the country is not accounted for when measuring fertility rates. A country that has gone from 
a high fertility level, to a lower level in a fast pace, might still experience high population 
                                                 
3 See Nguyen-Dihn(1990), Hondroyiannis (2004) and  Zhang (1990) for examples from Vietnam, Greece and 
China. 
Table 2: Population growth rate in selected Regions.  
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growth, due to a young population. First the fertility has to decline, before the young 
population (caused by the earlier high level of fertility) will keep the population growth at a 
high level for some time. At a later stage, the population growth can stabilize at a lower level. 
From 1985 to 1995, Nepal’s declining fertility and birth rate was accompanied by an 
increased population growth rate, underscoring the point that population development 
involves complex and slow processes.  
This is partly a discussion of terminology, but also of interpretation. Fertility and population 
growth are obviously very closely linked. In my empirical analysis, the number of surviving 
children at the individual level is used as the dependent variable. Number of children is thus 
highly relevant to the issue of population growth, but is no measure of population growth. 
I hope my findings to some degree have validity for other countries and areas of the world, 
but my main focus is on Nepal and the Nepalese society. 
2.2 The Nepalese Context 
Why look to Nepal when studying population in development countries? Nepal is ranked as 
144 of 182 countries in the last HDI index4, making it the poorest country in the South Asian 
region. South Asia is one of the regions that have experienced a big drop in fertility rate since 
1990 (Table 2). It is important to investigate the dynamics behind this drop to understand the 
societal changes taking place. It is also important as a means to understand and predict the 
development in areas of the world where population growth and fertility rates are still high. 
Nepal has two neighboring countries, China and India, who have both used untraditional5
The geography 
 
means to limit population growth. Nepal has had a high level of fertility, but has experienced 
a remarkable decline the last years, a drop from 4.6 in 1996 to 3.1 in 2006, according to the 
DHS Surveys (Ministry of Health and Population [Nepal] 2007a)  
Nepal is an agricultural society with 85 percent of its 29 million-population living in the 
countryside. It is a landlocked country with India south, east and west, and China (Tibet) to 
the north. Nepal is usually divided into three ecological zones, the Himalayan Mountains or 
the Mountain zone in the north, the flat Terai zone in the south and the Hills zone clustered in 
the middle. Most People live in the Terai and the Hills, with approximately equal shares, 
while some 1.5 million live in the mountains. Administratively, the country is divided into 
                                                 
4 Human Development Index (UNDP 2010). 
5 Both has used legal matters to limit family size. 
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five regions, Far-western, Mid-western, Western, Central and Eastern, with most people 
living in the two eastern regions. The regions are divided into 14 development zones, again 
divided into a total of 75 districts. On a smaller scale, Nepal has approximately 3000 Village 
Development Committee’s (VDCs) and 58 municipalities (cities). Every VDC has nine wards, 
which is the smallest unit of administration.  
The People 
Nepal is an ethnically diverse country. The Hindu caste system has many similarities with the 
Indian. As well, there are many ethnic minorities, many of whom have their own language, 
and there are also some religious minorities. The Hindus account for approximately 57 
percent of the population, the ethnic groups 37 percent and the Muslims, the largest religions 
minority, 4 percent. Even though the ethnic groups and the Muslims are outside the caste 
system, they are definitely included in the “hierarchical” system based on the castes, and they 
are often also referred to as castes. As well as being divided by castes, people from the Hills 
and Mountains regard themselves as “more Nepali” than the Terai people, so there is a 
geographical division as well. The system is highly complex and my intention is not to give 
an extensive introduction to the caste system here6
As stated, Nepal is a poor country. About one third of the Nepali population lives below the 
poverty line (Bhatta and Sharma 2006), and there are large differences between rich and poor. 
The economy has experienced growth during the last 20 years. This growth has let to 
decreasing poverty, while inequality may have increased (Hatlebakk 2008).  
. In my analysis, I have sorted the 
population based on certain criterions, which will be accounted for in the Variables and 
Hypotheses chapter.  
The political situation in today’s Nepal is somewhat unstable. After the ten year long civil war 
between the Maoists and the government, the King resigned and a republic was established in 
2008.  Recent disagreements between the ruling parties and the Maoists have caused troubles 
for both the writing of a constitution and the political stability in the country. The Prime 
minister today is from the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (UML) of Nepal, ruling in a 
coalition government without the support of the Maoist Party (the party with most seats in the 
parliament). A new constitution was supposed to be signed on May 28 this year, but the 
deadline is now extended with one year. 
                                                 
6For further reading about Nepalese castes, see e.g. Harka Gurung (2006). 
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2.3 Fieldwork 
In November 2009, I did a short field study in Nepal to increase my contextual knowledge 
about the Nepalese society and to better understand how family-size, contraception and other 
fertility-related issues are understood in Nepal. During a four-week-period, I interviewed 30 
households in two villages, as well as health workers, NGO workers and scholars involved in 
family planning. My experiences from the fieldwork will not be presented as findings, but I 
will use them throughout the thesis to better explain the reasoning behind my hypotheses and 
the results presented. Here I will, however, give a short summary of the fieldwork and some 
of the most central and important lessons I learned from it. The questionnaire used in the 
household interviews can be found in the appendix, and information received from the short 
survey will be provided upon inquiry. 
The Interviews 
The household interviews were done in two villages in Morang district in the eastern Terai 
zone, close to the Indian border. The average fertility rate in both the eastern region and the 
Terai zone corresponds with the rate in the country as a whole. The Terai Zone has 
traditionally been a densely populated area, but has experienced a massive immigration by 
people from the Hills. The people living in the Terai are hence a mix of people from both 
areas. The village of Haraicha has a diverse population with a mixture of ethnic groups from 
both the Terai and the Hills. Bajhanatpur was chosen because it has a large Dalit7
Interviews were done using questionnaires with both general questions about the households’ 
assets, education and occupation, and more specific question regarding the respondents’ 
fertility history and thoughts around the fertility situation in Nepal. Most of the questions 
were open, and questions were adjusted, added and removed, depending on the age, sex and 
situation of the respondent. Each interview took approximately 30 minutes. An experienced 
interpreter was used during the interviews. 
 population.  
Haraicha and Bajhanatpur, the two villages where we did interviews are both within a two 
hour drive from the second largest city in Nepal, Biratnagar. After deciding in which villages 
to do the interviews, I got access to voter lists with names of all the residents in each ward. 
Then I randomly decided in what wards to do the interviews, and furthermore picked every 15 
household from the list. I did a total of 30 household interviews in the two villages. The small 
number of respondents makes my findings inappropriate for statistical analysis. However, the 
                                                 
7 A Dalit is a low-caste, often referred to as “untouchable”. They are at the bottom of the caste system. 
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diversity in caste, ethnicity, education and age among my respondents has in my opinion been 
sufficient to give me substantial insights to some trends in family formation in Nepal. 
In Nepal, every ward is supposed to have its own Female Community Health Volunteer 
(FCHV8). The FCHV is one female that is chosen by the community’s mothers group to have 
contact with the VDC’s health post and provide health related information to the families in 
the ward. Most of the information the FCHVs provides maternal and newborn health, as well 
as family planning. They provide door-to-door- information, mothers’ group meetings and 
people can come to their house to get information. The FCHVs will therefore have good 
knowledge about attitudes towards contraception among the inhabitants of the ward and they 
also have opinions on how many children it is normal to have, if this has changed and if so, 
why. It was therefore natural to interview the FCHVs in most of the wards where household 
interviews were done. To what extent a FCHV is present in every ward in every Nepali 
village, I do not know, but there is supposed to be one. I definitely got the impression that the 
system was working quite well in the two villages visited, and they are central in delivering 
basic health services to woman and children in particular9
Small family is a happy family? 
. 
The most surprising experience for me during my interviews was the level of awareness about 
the economic consequences of child-raising, present among almost all respondents. In some 
way or another, most of the families were concerned with the expenses of getting and raising 
children.  
Also of interest, was how synchronized the respondents were regarding some of the questions. 
Nearly all the respondents answered “2-3” to the question “How many children is it normal to 
get in your caste?” Some had the impression that the lower castes got more children, but the 
lower-caste households mostly answered the same as the rest (again, this is not statistically 
appropriate work). The synchronization of the responses gives me the impression that 
information has successfully been transmitted from government and/or family planning 
agencies through health workers to the people. 
Regarding the Nepali peoples’ experience with family-size, it was obvious that this is not just 
a statistical issue; the declining fertility was clearly something most people had an opinion 
                                                 
9 The term volunteer is maybe not accurate anymore, as they after a strike now receive about 25 NOK per month 
for their work. 
9 See for example Ministry of Health and  Population [Nepal] (2007b). 
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about and had reflected upon. I got different answers, most of them related to better 
education. Increased food prices were also by some regarded as a reason to reduce the number 
of children. How the real prices of food have changed the last 10-15 years, is something I do 
not know, but I suspect that the reason that this was a frequent answer had mostly to do with a 
recent steep increase in food prices. The availability of contraception and a saying that “Small 
family is happy family” was also repeated at numerous occasions.  
One trend regarding the fertility pattern among Nepalese women that I learned during my 
fieldwork was that they marry and get their first child early, often before their twentieth 
birthday. Some then start using contraception quite early as well, while some continue to get 
children. This fits well with the information from the DHS dataset.  
 
 
 
The graph in Figure 1 shows that most women get married and have children before they turn 
20. Somewhat more unclear is the picture of when they get their last child, but most are under 
30, half are 25 or younger. In other words, there are clear indications that it is quite normal to 
get children early and then actively avoid to get more children. The figure does not contain 
information about those who are not finished with getting children and some might use 
contraception to postpone/space births. The “age of last birth” line is no absolute 
Figure 1: Fertility Pattern among Nepalese women 
The graph shows the 
distribution of age at first 
marriage, age at first birth and 
age at last birth. The age at 
last birth shows the age of the 
respondent at her last birth, 
given that she does not want 
any more children, is sterilized 
or is declared infecund.  
7791 of 10793 have ever given 
birth, 8640 have ever been 
married and 6027 is in the “last 
birth” group. 
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representation of at which age Nepalese women stop giving birth, but it gives a reasonable 
indication. 
Another point of interest is how number of children corresponds with fertility preferences. 
The table below shows the respondents ideal number of children10
 
 from the DHS in 1996 and 
2006:  
1996 2006 
# of children Frequency Percent # of children Frequency Percent  
0 2 0.02 0 37 0.34 
1 218 2.64 1 787 7.31 
2 2,987 36.24 2 6,477 60.14 
3 2,844 34.50 3 2,577 23.93 
4 1,767 21.44 4 748 6.95 
5 259 3.14 5 94 0.87 
6 102 1.24 6 36 0.33 
7 25 0.30 7 6 0.06 
8 21 0.25 8 4 0.04 
9 5 0.06 9 1 0.01 
10 11 0.13 10 2 0.02 
12 2 0.02 12 -  
      
 
Total 
 
10,769 
 
100.00 
 
Total 
 
8,243 
 
100.00 
         
The number of children the respondents state as ideal is of course likely to be affected by their 
actual number of children. Still, Table 3 shows that a majority of the Nepalese women regard 
two children as the optimal number, and that the view on family-size has changed somewhat 
during the ten years between the surveys. However, the Fertility rate has declined more than 
the desired fertility, indicating that increased availability of contraception has been an 
important facilitator for the decline, also suggested by Karki and Krishna (2008). 
I account the change in the perceptions of “the ideal family-size” in changes in norms in the 
Nepalese society. One of my respondents, a Dalit tailor, stated that: “People will laugh at you 
if you get many children”, indicating that family size is an issue that is subject to social 
stigma, “the ideal family” can be said to be partly constructed in the social sphere. Norms are 
difficult to test empirically, and a deeper look into how preferences and behavior have 
changed over time because of changing norms and awareness, calls for another approach. 
                                                 
10 Response to the question:” If you could go back to the time you did not have any children and could choose 
exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?” and “If you could choose 
exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?” asked to respondents with 
and without children respectively. The non-numeric answers (181 in 1996 and 23 in 2006) are removed. 
Table 3: Ideal Number of Children in Nepal, 1996 and 2006 
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Nevertheless, some of my socioeconomic variables are obviously connected with norms, 
which will be discussed further in the forthcoming chapters. 2.4 The Preference for sons 
Preferences for sons relative to daughters are apparent in Nepal (Leone, Matthews and 
Zuanna 2003 and Koolwal 2007). In this section, the issue and the consequences are sketched, 
while a detailed discussed about the potential for an excess of sons due to the combination of 
son-preference and declining fertility is presented in the discussion chapter. 
When daughters get married, they are regarded as a member of the in-law’s family rather than 
their own parents’. This means that they will not contribute with old-age security or help out 
in their family’s home after they are married. Daughters are also expected to bring dowry into 
their marriage, making them a monetary expense for the family11. This is obviously opposite 
for boys. In addition, only sons can traditionally perform the rituals at their father’s funeral12
 Strong gender preference can have serious negative consequences, for instance if it leads to 
biased gender ratios. As long as the fertility rate is high the problem is negligible, but as the 
fertility rate is declining and the boy-preference is present, the problem of a sex bias in the 
population arises. If or when ultrasound  and other technology gets widely available in Nepal, 
accompanied by further decline in fertility, sex-selective abortion can become a serious 
problem in Nepal, as it is in some parts of India (Arnold, Kishor and Roy 2002). The concept 
of gendercide
. 
This is regarded as highly important in many families. 
13 is important to have in mind, as the problem is present in the region and boy-
preference absolutely is present in Nepal. Amartya Sen was among the first to address the 
issue of an excess of boys, in his 1990 article “More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing” 
(Sen 1990). Nepal is for now following the “normal” pattern, with 104 boys born per 100 
females, while in India and China, 112 and 117 boys are born per 100 girls respectively14
But the preference itself also affects the fertility rate. My impression from interviewing health 
personnel and households is that the norm today is to get two children, but that it is accepted 
to get more if you have been “unlucky” (hence the “2-3” answer I frequently got when I asked 
about the normal number of children).  
. 
                                                 
11 A Hindu saying states: “Bringing up a daughter is like watering your neighbors’ garden”. 
12 However, at former Prime Minister GP Koirala’s funeral earlier this year, his daughter actually lit the funeral 
pyre (BBC 2010). 
13 Gendercide refers to the widespread killing of unborn (and born) girls experienced in India and China. 
14 CIA World Factbook (CIA 2010) 
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Empowering women and raising the value of girls is important for its own sake, but also to 
prevent what could be a serious problem for mothers, daughters and also the society as a 
whole.  
I did not get any indication that it was normal to try to find out the sex of the baby before 
giving birth in Nepal, but the preference for sons were definitely present. However, some 
young respondents seemed less occupied with the issue than their parents. The issue of boy-
preferences, its implications and consequences for the future is discussed in depth in the 
Hypotheses, the Findings and in the Conclusions. 
All in all, the fieldwork gave me interesting information and not least, the ability to interpret 
my results in the context they deserve to be interpreted. However, even though the contextual 
knowledge is important, my work is based on econometric analysis grounded on an economic 
theoretical foundation. I continue with the presentation of the theory. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
The history of economic population theories begin with one of the classical economic 
theories. Thomas Malthus is frequently mentioned together with Marx, Smith and Ricardo as 
one of the pioneers in the field of economics. He still receives support for his theory on 
population development today, 220 years after he launched the first edition of his essay, “On 
the Principle of Population”. The first part of the historical section of this chapter portrays 
Malthus’ contribution to population economics.  
The theory of the demographic transition is another approach that has been central in 
population studies in multiple social sciences, including economics, geography and sociology, 
and will thus also be central in my historical outline. The history continues with the 
emergence of microeconomic models of fertility behavior and the academic dispute that 
followed between two schools of microeconomic fertility-models. Two newer and more 
specific economic models of fertility are sketched.  
The historical part is included to give a chronological presentation of some of the most 
important theories in the field of population development. As well as being chronological, it 
starts out with the larger scope of population and economic development, moves through a 
more detailed description of change in population patterns and ends with a narrower focus on 
individual fertility decisions.  
The second of the three sections in this theory chapter is a presentation of a simple model 
inspired by Gary S. Becker, one of the main contributors in applying microeconomic concepts 
to family behavior. The empirical analysis that comes later in my thesis will to a large degree 
rest on his assumption that families’ demand tend to shift from quantity to quality of children 
as income increases. 
Lastly, some insights from the field of sociology are borrowed as the theoretical background 
for discussing female autonomy and fertility. 
3.1 Theoretical History 
“Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio, Subsistence, 
increases only in an arithmetical ratio” (Malthus 1798a) 
Thomas Robert Malthus starts his famous essay, “On the principle of population” with a 
suggestion that population cannot exceed food-production. He claims that population has the 
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potential to grow at a geometric rate, while food production can only grow at an arithmetic 
rate. He also claims that population growth will slow down because the poor will adjust their 
number of children to the reduced food supply and hence get fewer children (Malthus 1798b).  
An argument like this is quite the opposite of what is regarded the mainstream view now. 
Most of the population growth is taking place among the poorest, and that the rich reduce 
their reproduction. Even though Malthus’ essay is one of the classics in the history of 
economics, it is also a theory that has met massive critique during the last couple of hundred 
years. His failure to recognize that food production actually can grow quite fast (because of 
technological progress) and that population has a tendency to slow down as living standard 
increases has been criticized extensively (Sachs 2008). 
The Malthusian model provides a framework where the population and the economy have a 
relatively fixed relationship. We start by considering a population on the consistence level 
with a stable population that is adjusted to the level of recourses. If this population, for 
example because of technological progress or access to more land, experiences an upward 
shift in its supply of resources, the population will first have a period of higher living 
standard. In the next stage, population will begin to grow, until the population size has 
outweighed for the gain in standard of living. The population will stabilize itself on the initial 
level of living standard, or income per capita in more modern terms. In other words, the 
population will always converge towards a steady-state with constant income per capita. The 
model seems to be regarding humans in a very strict biological manner, not far from how 
animals behave (Darwin was actually highly inspired by the work of Malthus), but it separates 
us from animals in one particular sense. While animals maximize their reproduction rate with 
respect to available resources, humans take into account that their progenies shall not be 
living in poverty, having a predictive element in their decision-making that the animals lack. 
Still, the Malthusian theory has failed to predict the population and economic development 
that we have seen from the start of the nineteenth century and until today.  
Where did he go wrong? 
Economists have over the last year been criticized extensively for not being able to predict, 
but being very good to explain why things happened they way they did15
                                                 
15 Referring to how economists are accused of not being able to predict the financial crisis in 2008, but are lining 
up to explain “what went wrong”. 
. Perhaps then, is it 
no surprise that Malthus’ model fits well with the population growth and economic 
development in the world until he launched his theory, but from that point on, the theory does 
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not hold. There are two central assumptions on which the theory rests, that have been violated 
the last two centuries. In Malthus’ theory, a fixed supply of land implies that higher 
population growth inevitably leads to lower income per capita. History has shown that 
technological progress makes it possible for the population to grow over time together with 
both constant and increasing living standard. As well, Malthus claimed that population grows 
whenever income per capita is increasing. What is observed is that population growth might 
follow the economic growth in the beginning, but at some point, income per capita continues 
to grow (or even accelerates) while population growth rate declines. In some parts of the 
world, we even look at a declining population (Weil 2009).   
Malthus’ view on how the world is or is getting “overpopulated” has however gained some 
momentum as a consequence of the recent climate crisis and energy shortage. Even though 
technological innovations might be able to support a rapid population growth, more people 
means more resources have to be used, resources that contribute to global warming and 
climate change16
The Demographic Transition Theory 
. It should also be mentioned, that even though the Malthusian model is 
inappropriate to explain the world’s population pattern, the model can still be useful in 
geographically limited areas. 
Another important theory in the history of demography is the theory of the demographic 
transition. Unlike Malthus’ predictions, the theory of the demographic transition fits well with 
the later population development, at least in the western world. The demographic transition 
states, in short, that a society will move from a situation with uncontrollable and high 
mortality and fertility (sometimes referred to as a Malthusian stage or Malthusian stagnation), 
via a phase of lowered mortality rate but still high fertility (in this period the population 
obviously grows rapidly), to a stage of low mortality and low fertility. The decline in 
mortality is due to better healthcare, hygiene etc. The following fall in fertility, on the other 
hand, is not that straightforward to account for.  
The theory of demographic transition was developed in the 1930s, but it seems some scholars 
worked on the same principles simultaneously, not knowing about each other’s work. Frank 
Notesteins 1945 article Population: The Long View, is often seen as one of the first to define 
the dynamics that lay behind the theory (Kirk 1996). 
                                                 
16 See for example Jeffrey Sachs’ short comment The Specter of Malthus Returns (2008), Cohen (1995) and 
Guillebaud and Hayes (2008). 
 17 
 
 The historical picture of population development is complex and fragmented. The world 
population has been growing for thousands of years, and will continue to grow for some time. 
The rates, however, differs largely in both time and space. The population growth-rate in the 
world as a whole grew to its maximum during the 1960s and has been declining since 
(Schultz: 1997). The world is soon to reach 7 billion inhabitants, but the projections for the 
future are uncertain. The recent projections seem to be somewhat adjusted downwards 
compared to those from 15-20 years ago17
This declining rate has two explanations; either the mortality rate is increasing, or the fertility 
rate is declining. Even though mortality rates can increase in geographically limited areas in 
periods, the reason for the stabilization of the world population is falling fertility. My 
theoretical focus now shifts toward models that more specifically look at fertility and fertility 
determinants.  
. For those most pessimistic about that the growing 
population will lead to a dramatic resource crisis and self-destruction of our planet, this is 
good news.  
The Entering of the Microeconomic Focus on Individual Fertility 
The classical models presented above both explain population development on an aggregate 
level. From the 1950s, economists started to develop theories to better understand how 
household choices affect population, using concepts from micro-economics to explain fertility 
differentials. Analyzing family behavior in a traditional economic utility-maximizing way of 
thinking is largely influenced by the work of Gary S. Becker.  
Gary S. Becker won the Nobel Prize in 1992 for “having extended the domain of 
microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behavior and interaction, including 
nonmarket behavior”18 His contribution to the economics of the family is probably his most 
important work and what he is in particular known for is his models that focus on a trade-off 
between quantity of children and the quality on each child19
In short, the quality-quantity theory is based on an assumption that families face a trade-off 
between quantities of children, that is, how many children they want, and quality of children 
they get, that is, how much do they want to invest in each of them. Quality is not an 
. 
                                                 
17 Both UN and the World bank projected in 1990 the world population to be 10 billion in 2050, while UN now 
projects it to become around 9 (McNicoll 1992 and UN 2008). 
18 From the press release  (Nobel prize 1992). 
19 See for example Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker (1992). 
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expression of talent or abilities. Higher quality is defined as the utility gained from investing 
more in a child (Becker 1960). 
This tradition started in the 1950s, and has been developed further through the 60s, 70s and 
80s. Liebenstein and Mincer also made early contributions to the field (Schultz 1997). Mincer 
focused on one particularly important aspect regarding the costs of children. In Market Prices, 
Opportunity Costs, and Income Effects (Mincer 1963) Mincer underscores that the price a 
consumer pays for a commodity has to include the opportunity cost of time, that is, the loss 
the consumer has to face for not participating in money generating activities. This point is of 
great importance for family economics. Time spent in the family has that feature that it does 
not generate money and that it takes up time that could have been allocated to work. 
Especially mother’s income, since she traditionally has spent most of the time raising 
children, has been an important component in defining “the cost of children” in this literature. 
Critique of Becker; the Pennsylvania School 
Of the most controversial points in Becker’s original model, is how it handles preferences. He 
takes the consumers tastes as given, and the changes in behavior are explained by changes in 
prices and income opportunities. Becker’s view on exogenous tastes was to be challenged 
from another group of economists that meant that a household’s preferences are subject to 
change. 
Following Becker’s classic 1960 article, An Economic Analysis of Fertility, Richard Easterlin 
launched an alternative approach, which would lead to an academic dispute between Chicago-
Columbia school (Becker and his supporters) and the Pennsylvania school (led by Easterlin) 
(Sanderson 1976). Both schools used a microeconomic, utility maximizing framework as the 
basis for their analysis (Olsen 1994), but the Pennsylvania faction emphasized that households 
demand of children is decided by biological constraints and social norms. The shaping of 
preferences or tastes is central in the Pennsylvania approach, as are mortality rates and 
physical attributes (Easterlin 1975).  
One of the most influential articles from the Pennsylvania school is Harvey Leibenstein’s The 
Economic Theory of Fertility Decline (1975). This is partly a critique of the Becker-model 
and partly an alternative approach to deal with fertility differentials. Leibenstein argues that 
the utility of children differs between different status groups and different income groups. He 
does not strictly reject that the quantity-quality effect is present, but emphasizes that 
preferences vary greatly between groups and that preferences do not necessarily have 
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anything to do with income. He also stresses that the utility of children do not have the normal 
diminishing-returns-feature. In some societies (like Nepal), having two children is regarded as 
a minimum. The utility will then perhaps be large for number one and two, while maybe 
decrease dramatically from the third and so forth. 
The polemics between the two camps softened from the late 1970s. Especially the Chicago-
Columbia school moved towards the Pennsylvania, and during the late 80s Becker modified 
his view even on the way preference should be used in economic modeling, leading the 
schools even closer to each other (Pollak and Watkins 1993). From the 1990s, the two groups 
tried to find out how they could take advantage of their different strengths, rather than 
focusing on each other’s weaknesses (Olsen 1994 and Pollak and Watkins 1993). For instance 
they agreed upon main point is that higher income leads to fewer and “better” children 
expected by both (Sanderson 1976). My theoretical foundation is inspired by both schools. 
Some Economists (like Leibenstein) have also used insights from the field of sociology in 
their modeling. Sociologists have also been influenced by the way in which economists regard 
fertility and fertility decisions. Both Pollak and Watkins (1993) and Olsen (1994) mention this 
sociological view as a third group of influential contemporary fertility researchers. The 
sociological view is focusing on norms and group dynamics as important determinants for 
fertility behavior. 
Alternative Economic Approaches to Fertility Modeling 
In addition to the general models, economists have made use of more specific models to 
explain fertility differences. Eric Jensen (1990) presents a model where he explicitly looks at 
the old-age security motive for getting children, parents’ need for care when they are too old 
to work. He develops a two-period model based on the Lexicographic Safety First (LSF) 
principle.20 In the first period, parents try to get the number of children they regard as the 
minimum necessary to obtain a certain level of welfare in their old-age period their security-
level. During this period, the parents will try to minimize their birth-intervals, or hoard21
                                                 
20 LSF is a concept usually applied in agricultural economics. It states that instead of allocating the inputs to 
maximize profits, a farmer chooses a strategy where he aims to maximize his probability to reach some 
minimum level of output (or minimize the probability of not reaching that level). This level is marginally above 
a disaster level. 
. In 
the next period, all other interesting variables come into play and affects total number of 
children. 
21 Hoarding refers to a situation where parents basically try to get as many children as they can as quick as 
possible. 
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Another interesting view worth mentioning is laid out by Øystein Kravdal. He looks at the 
relationship between education and fertility, focusing on community level effects. As well as 
individual education, others’22
3.2 The Quality-Quantity-theory 
 education can have effect on the household’s fertility. On the 
community level, availability of information, change in norms as a result of a generally more 
educated community, and changes in the labor market can be relevant factors. The neighbor’s 
attitudes can affect your own thoughts regarding family, and on the country level, educational 
reforms can lead to deep changes for the population as a whole, also across education levels. 
He finds some evidence of such effects in his cross-country study of sub-Saharan African 
countries (Kravdal 2001). 
In this part I will start with a discussion about parents’ motive for getting children and further 
show how the quality-quantity trade-off can be used to explain why parents might desire 
fewer children when their income increases.  
Why do families want children? 
There are some obvious biological reasons, for example the desire to reproduce and there’s 
also joy and comfort related to children. None of these will be accounted for specifically, but 
they are included in the preferences. What I do deal with, is the economic motive. The 
relationship between the relative importance of biological, economic and “joy and comfort” 
motives differs both in time and across countries. I expect the economic part of the decision 
making to have relatively higher importance in low-income countries than in the 
industrialized countries. The economic motive for getting children can be divided into three 
parts: 
• Costs 
o All costs related to bringing up children 
• Gains 
o Gains from children’s production, either in the labor market or in the 
household. 
o Old-age-security 
The costs and gains of children depend on how many children you have, and how much you 
invest in each of them. The old-age-security depends on the same, but most important in this 
                                                 
22 Others can refer to neighbors, village residents, fellow countrymen etc. (Kravdal 2001:235) 
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respect is probably to have one surviving provider. In the following presentation of the 
quality-quantity model, I do not explicitly divide between different motives behind the desire 
for children. 
The Outline of a Simple Model 
Based on the framework presented in Bardhan and Udry (1999: 22-24), I consider a family 
whose utility depends on the number of surviving children, n, their quality, z, and 
consumption of market goods, x: 
𝑈𝑈 =𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥,𝑛𝑛, 𝑧𝑧;𝜶𝜶) 
The utility is assumed to be increasing in consumption of market goods and in children’s 
quality. Regarding number of children, the effect on utility is uncertain, but a higher number 
will probably give higher utility when number of children is relatively small. Children’s 
quality (or human capital) is produced by a time-input: parents time spent with children, t, and 
a monetary input: children-consumption, c: 
𝑧𝑧 = 𝑍𝑍(𝑐𝑐, 𝑡𝑡;𝜷𝜷)/𝑛𝑛 
Children’s consumption is money spent in children’s human capital, such as schooling and 
health. The α in the utility function is a vector of exogenous factors affecting the households 
preferences and 𝜷𝜷 in the production function is a vector of the household technology that 
affects the production of child quality. Both consumption and time is constrained by parents’ 
participation in the labor-market: 
𝑤𝑤(1 − 𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
The cost of spending time (t) with children is the income loss, tw, because the time could be 
spent generating income. The p’s are the prices of market goods and child consumption, 
respectively. The family’s problem is to maximize utility with respect to own consumption, 
number of children, children-consumption and time spent with children. max
𝑥𝑥 ,𝑛𝑛 ,𝑐𝑐 ,𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥,𝑛𝑛, 𝑧𝑧;𝜶𝜶) 
 For the purpose of this thesis, the maximization of the utility function is not of great 
importance, but this formal framework provides me with tools to discuss how the quality-
quantity model works. 
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In this model, one restrictive assumption is made. All children in a family are assumed to 
have (or get) the same level of quality, so an increase in quality for one child, applies to every 
child in the household. By the same token, getting another child means investing the same 
amount of time and money as has been invested in previously born children. This is a normal 
approximation when modeling household fertility,23
The family in this simple model faces a situation where there is a trade-off between parents’ 
consumption of market goods, number of children and the quality of the children. Spending 
more time working increases the possibilities of consume, but at the same time reduces the 
possibility to spend time with their children, hence not investing in their human capital. 
Higher number of children means that, holding the time spent with children constant, each 
child will have less quality. Quality of children can be produced by either allocating money or 
time to them. Allocating money to children’s consume reduces the possibilities to consume 
market goods. On the other hand, allocating time to children is in conflict with participating in 
income-generating activities. At the same time, children can also be seen as investment goods, 
so investing both time and money in them can be regarded as switching from immediate to 
future consumption.  
 but is worth mentioning, as it is a critical 
assumption. It has received deserved criticism (Schultz: 1997) for not accounting for 
differences between first-born and later-born, and more importantly; between boys and girls. 
For the sake of my analysis, the assumption is wrong, but for the sake of discussing the main 
points of the quality-quantity theory, it does not make a significant difference. 
The Effect of Income on Fertility 
The main question that I seek to answer through the quality-quantity-model is: How does 
income affect fertility? Gary Becker states it like this: 
An increase in income must increase the amount spent on the average good, but not 
necessarily that spent on each good. (…)Since children do not appear to be inferior members 
of any broader class, it is likely that a rise in long-run income would increase the amount spent 
on children (Becker 1960: 211) 
Becker’s quote implies that an increased wage should lead to “more children”, but that most 
of the increased wage is allocated to increased quality and not quantity. “More children” is 
not necessarily referring to “a higher number of children”, but “the amount spent on 
children”. Thus, increased wage can actually lead to fewer children demanded even though 
children is assumed to be a normal good, if the cost of quality is large enough to dominate the 
                                                 
23 Used e.g. in Beckers original model (Becker 1960). 
 23 
 
income effect (Becker 1992: 188). The model I present does not provide any clear-cut 
answers to how this works, but does leaves plenty room for discussion about the matter.  
An increase in the wage-rate of the female parent in the household, first and foremost 
increases the opportunity cost of raising children, the price of t. Following normal labor-
theory, increased income has two effects. The income effect will make the individual work 
less, as she can earn the same amount of money while working fewer hours. The substitution 
effect makes the worker allocate more hours to wage-labor, substituting away from leisure (in 
this model, time spent on children’s training) which has become relatively more expensive. If 
the women in question choose to dedicate more time to work because of the increased wage, I 
would assume at the same time that the family wants to share the extra income between adult 
and child consumption, x and c. The time spent with children is reduced so to keep the level 
of quality per child (z) constant, the family has the choice between increasing amounts spent 
on each child (c) or to reduce number of children (n) or both. If (i) the price of child quality is 
sufficiently high, (ii) the returns from investing in child quality is sufficiently high (investing 
much in one gives higher expected returns than investing less in two), or (iii) the increased 
income has reduced the need for old-age security, it is likely that the household will choose to 
get fewer children as a result of the wage-increase. 
In the discussion above, the mother was the one that experienced the wage-increase. If the 
husband/male-parent receives an increased wage and the women do most of the household 
work (including raising children), the cost of spending time with children is constant, while 
the income is increased. Intuitively, this will lead to higher demand for market goods, quality 
of children and number children, but higher number of children means that the mother has 
less time with each of them, so more has to be spent on c to keep quality per child constant. 
As Becker points out in the quote above, if the household’s preferences change and/or the 
price of quality is high, a wage increase for the husband can also lead to fewer children.  
Further Interpretation 
How do preferences change with income? If the increased income is related to general 
economic growth, preferences can shift towards more human capital in each child and fewer 
children because of modernization of both production technologies and the society as such 
(Bardhan and Udry 1999: 122-123). As well, modernization and income growth can increase 
the availability and quality of the education system, making it possible to invest more in 
quality.  
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Preferences can also be affected by norms and social awareness. An exogenous change in the 
perception of the importance of education, or the awareness of the potentially negative 
consequences of having large families can affect the relationship between utility gained from 
quality and utility gained from quantity of children. Other socioeconomic factors are also 
relevant in the preference parameter. A family living on a small family farm in the Himalayas 
may have different rate of returns from investing time and money in children than a family in 
Kathmandu. The availability of schooling and job opportunities might make education more 
important in urban than in rural areas. Discrimination in the labor market (between gender and 
castes for instance), can also lead parents to avoid investing in children if the expected returns 
from investing in education is low. Electricity and other household technologies can make the 
time spent at home more efficient24
3.3 Female Autonomy and Fertility 
.  
Sociologist Karen O. Mason (1987) introduces some interesting concepts on the relationship 
between intra household power structures and fertility in development countries. She sums up 
five arguments for how female autonomy should be inversely related to fertility. Firstly, early 
marriage can be associated with high fertility, and female autonomy is likely to decrease the 
relative importance of early marriage. Concerning contraception usage, higher relative power 
can both make the wife’s voice in fertility related issues stronger and encourage “innovative 
behavior, such as using modern contraceptives”(Mason 1987: 738). This second point 
obviously rests on the assumption that women have a desire for fewer children than men. 
Further, the opportunity cost of children increases if more autonomous females are more 
likely to get education and well paid jobs. Lastly, if the general equality of genders in the 
society is increased, men’s concern for women’s well- being is probably greater. This could 
reduce fertility; again, conditional on that the demand for children differs across sexes (Mason 
1987). Both Dyson and Moore (1983) and Morgan et al (2002) find that female autonomy 
indeed is negatively related to fertility behavior. Both studies are carried out in South and 
South East Asia, and should therefore be applicable to the Nepalese society as well. 
I expect fertility (measured as number of children) to be affected by a number of variables, 
some of which are directly associated with the Becker Model, some are not. The quality-
quantity model has been shown difficult to test empirically (Hotz et al 1997 and Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1980), but the goal for this thesis is not to test the Becker Model as such, but to 
                                                 
24 This can work directly or more likely through the fact that less time is spent on cooking etc, leaving more time 
free to spend with children. 
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use some of the concepts from his model as a foundation for parts of my analysis. As Zhang 
(1990) point out, it is useful to combine the Chicago-school approach with other elements. 
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4. Empirical Model & Methodology  
From the theory, I move toward the empirical work, presenting the empirical model, the data, 
the empirical methodology and my hypotheses. 
4.1 Empirical Model 
Even though there are many interesting ways to model fertility, the Quality-Quantity model 
provides a good theoretical framework as a basis for my empirical analysis. Income and 
education will have effects on the demand for both quality and quantity of children, and this 
will be analyzed within the concepts and relationships provided by the model. In addition to 
the effects explained in the Becker-model, I focus on female autonomy, socioeconomic 
background variables, and gender-preferences. Attitudes towards fertility and family size are 
often made both inside the family and also as a process where the extended family, the 
community and to a certain degree the whole society is involved. A typical notion to use in 
this respect is “norms”. If there are differences between regions or castes and this effect does 
not diminish when income and education is accounted for in the model, it is reasonable to 
assume that there are differences is norms that lead to these differences. There are few (but 
some) logic explanations to why geography and ethnicity per se should have any effect on 
fertility. This is discussed and explained in detail in both the Variables and Hypotheses 
chapter and the Analysis chapter. 
Instead of the Becker-model on structural form, I construct a reduced form equation where 
number of children is as a function of the exogenous variables. 
The reduced form equation will then be as follows: 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴,𝑊𝑊,𝐹𝐹,𝑍𝑍),   𝑌𝑌 = 0,1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 
Y is the number of children, and is defined as a function of the respondent’s age (A), wealth 
(W), female autonomy (F) and a group of other explanation variables, (Z), that includes 
socioeconomic status, education, preference for sons and others. 
4.2 The Data 
Demographic and Health Surveys 
The data used is based on the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 2006. The 
organization Measure DHS have since 1984 been involved in DHS-surveys throughout the 
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developing world. USAID is the main economic contributor and ICF Macro is implementing 
the surveys. In Nepal, the NGO New Era had the responsibility of the interviews. The first 
round of DHS surveys done in Nepal was in 1987, and the 2006 edition is the fifth round of 
DHS surveys in Nepal.  
My dataset comprise information about 10 793 women and 4 397 men from 8 707 
households, and is nationally representative (Ministry of Health and Population [Nepal] 
2007b). The dataset is divided into 7 recode files, women, men, births, children, couples, 
household and household member. For this thesis, only the women recode file is necessary. 
The men’s recode could be useful, but only to fill out missing information about the 
respondent’s husbands. Only a fraction of the women have their husbands interviewed, so it is 
not applicable in my analysis. The women recode file contains all necessary information 
regarding births, households and husbands that is useful for my purpose. All interviewed 
women are all in their fecund age, that is, 15-49. The questionnaire used in the survey 
contains questions about the respondent’s health, family relations, household characteristics, 
education, occupation, births, children’s health and other questions related to socioeconomic 
status, health and demography. 
The unmarried women are removed from the dataset, because they can cause disturbance for 
some variables. Especially regarding the female autonomy variable are the unmarried women 
a problem, because their position in the household is not the same as for married women25.  
None of the 2100 unmarried respondents report that they have ever given birth, thus, no 
respondents of interest is missed26
                                                 
25 To be more accurate; unmarried women are regarded part of the family they are born into, while married 
women are regarded as part of the family they are married into. 
. It could be interfered that when so many of the 
respondents without children are excluded, interesting information about those choosing not 
to have children are lost. However, it is not normal for Nepalese women to choose to not get 
any children. I do expect that most of the removed respondents will marry and get a family at 
some point, though this is something I cannot know for sure. The removal of these 
respondents also reduces the problem with the dataset being zero-inflated, which will be 
discussed in the Methodology section. In the analysis, three samples are used; i) the all 
married sample, ii) all married with at least one child and iii) all married with at least two 
children. This is due to the specification of the dependent variable, which will be accounted 
for later in this chapter. 
26 Giving birth before marriage is socially unacceptable in Nepal. Some underreporting is obviously expected, 
but I believe that the number anyway is extremely low. 
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Sample Design 
The DHS data is usually weighted. The reason for this is that the probability that a household 
is selected to take part in the survey is not necessarily the same for every household. For 
example, if the probability of being selected is different in urban or rural areas, this has to be 
accounted for to make the sample representative on a national level (Rutstein and Rojas 2006: 
12-13). Urban respondents are intentionally oversampled to get a representative selection. 
This is adjusted for by sampling weights (Ministry of Health and Population [Nepal] 2007b). 
The sample for the 2006 Nepal DHS is based on a two-stage stratified selection. At the first 
stage, 260 primary sampling units (PSUs)27
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
 are selected, with probability of being selected 
corresponding to their size. At the next stage, on average 30 households in urban and 36 in 
rural areas is selected. The number of households in each PSU varies. According to Anjushree 
Pradhan at New Era (with whom this was discussed in Kathmandu), the reason for this is that 
after the rural PSU’s are chosen, they are divided into groups of twelve households of which 
three groups are randomly chosen. When the number of households is not exactly divisible by 
twelve, one of the groups will be larger or smaller. If this group is chosen as one of the three 
groups, the number of households in the PSU is not exactly 36. This is supposed to be an 
issue only for rural areas. In the urban areas, 30 households are individually drawn. This does 
not fit perfectly with the number of households per PSU observed in the dataset, probably due 
to replacements because of non-responses.  
In this chapter, the econometric methods used in the analysis, namely the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) analysis and Poisson Regression Model are presented. The major challenge 
regarding my dataset is that number of children, the dependent variable, is an integer valued 
variable that is not normally distributed. Traditionally, this is assumed to make the OLS 
estimator biased. The Poisson Regression model is specifically designed to deal with such 
data, and is therefore also applied. However, it is not obvious which model gives the best 
results, but it makes sense to use more than one econometric model, at least for the sake of 
comparison.  
                                                 
27 The PSU’s are subwards in urban areas. In rural areas every PSU is a subward, a ward or a collection of wards 
in rural areas. The definition of a ward is found in the Background-Fieldwork chapter. 
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After presenting the OLS model, its assumptions, and a more detailed discussion of its 
limitation handling integer-valued variables (or count data); a presentation of the Poisson 
Regression Model is given.  
Throughout this chapter, I use fertility data in general and the DHS data in particular to 
exemplify. This is however not a part of the analysis, which is done in the next chapter. 
4.3.1 The OLS Regression Model 
The OLS regression model is based on the Classical Linear Model (CLM) assumptions 
(Wooldridge 2006). The simple regression model states that a variable, y, changes in a certain 
manner as another variable, x, changes. In economic analysis, we are interested in finding out 
how variables affect each other, for instance how fertility changes with income. Equation 
(4.1) formulates the problem in the following way: 
 𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥+ 𝑢𝑢 (4.1) 
 
where y is the explained (dependent) variable and x is the explanatory (independent) variable. 
𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽0 defines the relationship between the two variables. The 𝛽𝛽1 measure the marginal 
effect; how y changes when x changes, and 𝛽𝛽0 is a constant; its effect on y is not dependent on 
the value of x. When displaying the relationship graphically, 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept on the y-axis, 
and 𝛽𝛽1 is the slope parameter. The the error term is represented by u and includes all other 
factors that affect y except from x. This model is hardly used since it only allows for one 
explanatory variable. The Multiple regression model can be written as: 
 𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 + 𝑢𝑢 (4.2) 
 
Where 𝛽𝛽1is the parameter expressing the relationship between 𝑥𝑥1 and y, likewise for 
𝛽𝛽2 through 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 , while 𝛽𝛽0, y and u has the same interpretation as in the simple model. In the 
OLS method, it is assumed that the y and the 𝛽𝛽‘s has a linear relationship: 
Assumption 1, Linear in Parameters: 
The population model can be written as: 𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 + 𝑢𝑢 where 𝛽𝛽0, 
𝛽𝛽1, … ,𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  are unknown parameters (constants) of interest and u is an unobservable random 
error term. 
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This implies that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables follow a 
linear pattern, that the relationship is the same regardless of the value of the variable.  
Assumption 2, Random Sampling: 
We have a random sample of size n {𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2, … ,𝑘𝑘,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 : 𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑛𝑛} following the population 
model in assumption 1. 
When doing statistical analysis, information from the whole population of interest is usually 
not available or is highly impractical to collect. A selection is then drawn from the population. 
The selection we use in the regression model is randomly sampled: 
The estimated OLS regression model is: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽�0 + 𝛽𝛽�1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽�2𝑥𝑥2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝛽�𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 + 𝑢𝑢� (4.3) 
 
where ?̂?𝛽1 … ?̂?𝛽𝑘𝑘  represents estimates of the population values, and 𝑢𝑢 � is the estimated error 
term, the residual. The variables in the estimated model must have the characteristic that they 
are not perfectly correlated: 
Assumption 3, No Perfect Collinearity: 
In the sample (and therefore in the population), none of the independent variables are 
constant, and there are no exact linear relationships among the independent variables. 
Perfect collinearity is present when two of the independent variables for some reason are 
exactly the same or a variable is an exact liner function of (an) other variable(s). If I for 
example included both education in years of schooling and months of schooling as 
independent variables, perfect collinearity would be present. The way to deal with the 
problem is remove the variable(s) that causes collinearity. The interpreting of regression 
coefficients is the effect of a variable, when all other variables are held constant. This does 
not make sense when two or more variables have exact linear relationship. Some collinearity 
is of course not necessarily problematic and is practically impossible to avoid. However, high 
degree of multicolinearity can make the estimates difficult to interpret.  
The population error term is an unknown parameter. In the Classic Linear Model, the 
expected value of the error term needs to have the following property: 
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Assumption 4, Zero Conditional Mean: 
The error term, u, has an expected value of zero given any value of the independent variables. 
In other words, 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) = 0 
The interpretation of assumption 4 is that all relevant factors that affect y are included in the 
model; the error term should be zero on average.  
Assumption 5, Homoskedasticity: 
The error, u, has the same variance given any value of the explanatory variables. In other 
words 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑢𝑢|𝑥𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) = 𝜎𝜎2 
The variance is an important concept in regression analysis. It is an expression of the variation 
in the variable’s values around the mean of the variable. The estimator variance is a measure 
of how far away from the true parameter the estimator is expected to be. 
When obtaining the estimator variance, the homoskedasticity assumption is central. If the 
variance is not constant for all values of the independent variables, heteroskedasticity is 
present. Heteroskedasticity might make it difficult to get significant variables, and in addition 
cause interpretation difficulties. There might be good reasons for a data to exhibit 
heteroskedasticity, and although it could be a major problem, it can be corrected for in 
statistic computer applications28
In addition to being have a zero conditional mean and being homoskedastic, the error is 
assumed to be normally distributed: 
. 
Assumption 6, Normality 
The population error, u is independent of the explanatory variables, 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘  and is 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance 𝜎𝜎2:𝑢𝑢~𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2) 
This is a strong assumption, implying that the sum of the unobserved factors is independent of 
the variables and normally distributed. Whether this assumption is correct depends on the data 
on hand. However, the error term is unobserved, so whether it is normally distributed or not is 
a theoretical discussion. Even more important is whether a violation of the assumption poses a 
large problem and how to deal with it. For big samples, a violation is not a big problem and 
taking the log of the dependent variable can make the distribution closer to the normal 
                                                 
28 The variance estimator in my empirical analysis corrects for heteroskedasticity The variance estimator in the 
survey command in STATA is using the Huber-White robust variance. 
 32 
 
(Wooldridge 2006). Under the CLM assumption, the OLS estimators are BLUE, Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators29
Obtaining the estimators  
. The normality assumption’s applicability concerning count data is 
discussed later.  
The OLS method applies to the linear regression model, meaning that there is a linear 
connection between the explanatory variables (the x’s) and the explained variable (the y). The 
estimates are obtained by minimizing the sum of the squared residuals. The estimation 
method used is called the Method of moments approach. The Method of Moments approach 
uses the sample average as the unbiased estimator. In this section, for simplicity, I use the 
simple regression model with one explanatory variable: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
⇒ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (4.4) 
 
To find the estimator, we use that the expected value of the error is zero and assumption 4: 
 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢) = 0 (4.5) 
 
In addition, the covariance between x and u is expected to be zero30
 
: 
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥,𝑢𝑢) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢) = 0 (4.6) 
 
Inserting the regression model into 4.6 and 4.7 gives: 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦 − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥� = 0 (4.7) 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑥𝑥�𝑦𝑦 − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥�] = 0 (4.8) 
The aim is to find estimates for the parameters. We have a selection of n respondents and 
estimate the population parameter counterparts using: 
 
1
𝑛𝑛
�(𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽�0 − 𝛽𝛽�1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 0 (4.9) 
                                                 
29 Best=with lowest variance, Linear=linear in parameters, Unbiased=the estimator is an unbiased estimator of 
the true population parameter. 
30 Zero covariance means that the variables are independent of each other (not correlated). 
 33 
 
 
1
𝑛𝑛
�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽�0 − 𝛽𝛽�1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 0 (4.10) 
 
Rewriting  4.10: 
1
𝑛𝑛
�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝛽0 − ?̂?𝛽1 1𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  
and defining the means: 
1
𝑛𝑛
�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 1𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = ?̅?𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
Gives 
 𝑦𝑦� = 𝛽𝛽�0 + 𝛽𝛽�1𝑥𝑥�  ⇒ 𝛽𝛽�0 = 𝑦𝑦� − 𝛽𝛽�1𝑥𝑥�  (4.11) 
 
When the slope parameter is known, the intersection is easily computed by 4.11. Inserting this 
equation into 4.10 gives: 
�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖[𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − (𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦� − ?̂?𝛽1?̅?𝑥) −  ?̂?𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖] = 0 ⟹�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 = ?̂?𝛽1 �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥 − ?̅?𝑥)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
( 1
𝑛𝑛   is dropped here, as it do not affect the solution) 
Using the property that: 
�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥) = �(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥)2  𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎  �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�) = �(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥 �)(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  
As long as  
�(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥)2 > 0𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  
The estimator is: 
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𝛽𝛽�1 = ∑ (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥 �)(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1∑ (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥�)2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
 
(4.12) 
Mathematically, it can be shown that, given the assumptions, the OLS estimator is BLUE. 
The calculation above is from Wooldridge (2006). 
OLS and Count Data 
Emphasizing the last sentence, given the assumptions, the OLS estimators are appropriate. 
Are the assumptions realistic, do they hold in my dataset, and if not, what are the 
consequences and further, what are the solutions? 
The dependent variable in this case is a typical example of a count variable; it can only take 
on integer values and cannot take on negative values, 𝑦𝑦 = {0,1,2, …𝑛𝑛}. The typical place 
where the OLS assumptions are violated when dealing with count data, is the normality 
assumption, is the error term normally distributed? When the dependent variable is a 
continuous variable which can take on any values, this assumption is usually unproblematic. 
However, this is not the case for my dependent variable: 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the dependent variable in my dataset (the line in the graph 
is the normal distribution). Zero is the most frequent observation, and since there are no 
Figure 2: The dependent variable. 
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negative responses, the distribution only have one-sided tail. The variable is not normally 
distributed.  
When the model is predicted, it does not follow the true population distribution perfectly. The 
difference between the estimated and the true model are the error terms. The crucial point is 
thus; how are the errors distributed? Since the dependent variable is not normally distributed, 
the error term has the same property (Wooldridge 2006). Regarding count data, the main 
interference against the OLS method, is that the error term cannot be normally distributed 
because when the variable in question can only take on few values. However, if it is assumed 
that most of the variation in the model is explained by the independent variable, so that the 
difference between the estimated and the true model is not very large (and not very biased). 
Furthermore, as the sample is large, the error term can still be close to normally distributed.  
There is however a few models that specifically deal with count data dependent variables, the 
Poisson Regression Model being one of the most frequently used. This model is especially 
appropriate for data such as the ones I am dealing with (Wooldridge 2006 and Greene 1997).   
4.3.2 The Poisson Counting Process, Distribution and Regression 
Model 
In the Poisson Regression Model, that the data follow a Poisson distribution rather than the 
normal distribution. The Poisson distribution is a certain probability distribution that requires 
that the variable follow a Poisson Counting Process.  
The Poisson Counting Process 
A counting process is a situation where a certain event happen a number of times in a given 
time interval. N(t) is the number of events occurring before time t. Definition: 
a. 𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0 
b. N(t) is integer valued 
c. If s<t, 𝑁𝑁(𝑠𝑠) ≤ 𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡) 
d. For s<t, 𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑁𝑁(𝑠𝑠) gives the number of events in the time interval (s,t). 
In addition, the following features may apply to a counting process: 
a. The process possesses Independent Increments if the numbers of events occurring 
in two independent intervals are independent. 
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b. The process possesses Stationary Increments if the distribution of the number of 
events taking place in a time interval is only depending on the length of the 
interval, not when the interval takes place. 
A Poisson counting process requires both independent and stationary increments (Ross 1993).  
Independent Increments 
Independent Increments means that the number of events taking place in a certain interval 
should not be affected by how many events occurred in a preceding (or succeeding) interval. 
For births on an aggregate level, this does not apply; obviously the number of births in a 
population is affected by how many births took place 20 years ago. On the individual level it 
can be argued that the process of getting children has independent increments, because getting 
one child does not necessarily affect the possibility to get another. Medically speaking, this 
probably applies, unless one considers that complications during the pregnancy or birth might 
affect the possibility to get children later. There is also a certain period after a birth that 
women cannot get children, but this can be accounted for. 
Putting the medical aspects aside, is it plausible to believe that any two disjoint time intervals 
are independent? There might be two effects at play, those who are getting many children 
rapidly are perhaps more disposed to get even more children. For instance, young age at first 
birth is often correlated with getting many children. On the other hand, the probability of 
getting additional children after already having one or two is likely to get smaller, decisions 
regarding children are affected by prior births. This depends on the number of children as 
well. In some situations, for example for few number of children, having given birth to one 
might not at all affect the desire to get another (want more than one anyway), but to believe 
that this will apply for all time intervals is a very strong assumption, and is probably not true.  
Stationary Increments 
When discussing Stationary increments, I will also begin with the medical point of view. Is it 
realistic to assume that all the women are identically able to get children regardless of their 
age? Although women from 15-49 are all in their “fertile age”, I suppose that the probability 
of getting pregnant and successfully give birth is larger for those between 18 and 35 than for 
those outside this age-group. 
As previously argued I expect that most women in Nepal follow the pattern of getting married 
and get children early and then stop getting children after having got their desired number of 
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children. This does not go well with stationary increments, and I find it difficult to argue that 
the fertility data have this feature unless making assumptions with few links to reality. 
The Poisson Regression Model 
The Poisson Regression model is based on the Poisson distribution. The Poisson distribution 
says that the probability that x events take place in any given time interval is: 
 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥!  (4.13) 
 
λ is the mean of such occurrences in the relevant time-span. In the Poisson regression model, 
the probability that the dependent variable takes on a certain value is: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖� = 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖!  ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 0,1,2, … (4.14) 
 
λ is a parameter related to the independent variables, for example as  𝜆𝜆 = 𝒙𝒙𝜷𝜷, where 𝒙𝒙𝜷𝜷 are 
vectors of the x and 𝛽𝛽 (the variables and the coefficients. Assume an ordinary regression 
model, 
 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 
 
(4.15) 
 
As already discussed, the linear model has limitations when dealing with count data, but to get 
to the Poisson regression equation, I start with the normal linear model. I want to find the 
expected value of y conditional on x, using an exponential function: 
 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2, … ,𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) = exp(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) (4.16) 
 
The exponential function is convenient when dealing with count data, because it is always 
positive (so the expected value will be positive). Also, it can handle zero-values, as is not the 
case for the logarithm-function. Taking the log of the expected value function, gives: 
 log[𝐸𝐸 (𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2, … ,𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘)] =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 (4.17) 
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In other words, the log of the expected value is a linear function. Instead of using the normal 
distribution, it is usual to make the assumption that the count dependent variable, conditional 
on the independent variables has a Poisson distribution. I define 
 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|𝒙𝒙) = exp(𝒙𝒙𝜷𝜷) (4.18) 
 
where the expected value is the same as the exponential function presented above (function 
4.16). The probability that y takes on a certain value, h, using the Poisson distribution is: 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = ℎ|𝒙𝒙) = exp−exp(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙)exp(𝒙𝒙𝜷𝜷)ℎ
ℎ!  ,ℎ = 0,1, …, (4.19) 
 
 This is as the same function 4.14, but the λ is replaced by the expected value of the y or the 
mean of y conditional on x. This distribution gives us the opportunity to find the probability 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = ℎ|𝒙𝒙) that the dependent variable takes on any value. 
Problems with the Poisson Regression Model Zero-inflated data 
In count data it is not unusual that you have an excess of zeroes, or a zero-inflated dataset; the 
data contains more zeros than what would normally be expected.  
The main reason that respondents don’t have children is that they have not yet reached the age 
when they will get their first child. This indicates that there is an excess of zeros, but on the 
other hand, there is an excess of ones and twos, probably also threes and fours for the same 
reason. The point is that the variable is zero-inflated if interpreted as “how many do Nepalese 
women get”, but maybe not if interpreted as “how many children do Nepalese women of 
different age have”. The last interpretation is the correct one, and the variables concerning age 
and marriage will probably deal with the problem. If the data is expected to be zero-inflated, 
the solution is to use a model specified for such data, for example zero inflated Poisson. Over-/underdispersion 
One particular assumption of the Poisson regression is equidispersion; the dependent variables 
variance is equal to its mean: 
 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑦𝑦|𝒙𝒙) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|𝒙𝒙) (4.20) 
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This doesn’t always hold, and a normal problem is overdispersion of the variance; the 
variance is bigger than the mean. Underdispersion can also occur, but is less frequently 
experienced.  
Overdispersion and underdispersion is associated with independence of events. The variance 
is the same as the mean of the variable if the events have independent increments. 
Overdispersion will occur if events are positively correlated, underdispersion if the events are 
negatively correlated (Nguyen-Dinh 1997). As earlier discussed, births can be argued to have 
independent increments. To get an indication, checking the mean and standard error is an 
idea. At first sight, there are signs of overdispersion in the data, as the variance of the 
dependent variable is 3.41, compared to the mean, 2.69. 
If the model is overdispersed, the Negative binomial regression model is an option. This 
model is less strict regarding the relationship between the mean and variance. I do run a 
Negative Binomial Regression on one of the models to test for overdispersion. 
Goodness-of-fit 
In the OLS analysis, the R-squared is the usual way to check the goodness-of-fit, or the 
explanatory power of the model. The R-squared cannot be used in Poisson Regression, but 
STATA reports a Pseudo R-squared. The interpretation of the Pseudo R-squared (McFadden’s 
R-squared) is not analogous to the R-squared reported in OLS regression, but should give an 
indication of the fit of the model. 
 In addition to the McFadden’s R-squared and running the Negative Binomial Regression, I 
do a deviance goodness of fit test. A chi-squared test is testing whether the Poisson 
distribution is correct. The goodness of fit results will be reported in the data analysis chapter. 
4.4 Variables and Hypotheses 
This section explains why variables include chosen the, how they’re modified to suit the 
model and which direction I expect their signs to have in the empirical analysis. A list of all 
the variables, their names and descriptive statistics are found in Appendix 2. Descriptive 
statistics of the most important variables is also presented in Table 4 in the findings. 
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4.4.1 Dependent Variable 
The choice of dependent variable might have important impact on the results. Regarding 
fertility analysis, there are a few options. Since child-mortality-rate still is quite high in Nepal, 
total number children ever born, would not be the best choice. If a child dies at young age, I 
would expect the family to try to get another quickly after, as the decision to get the child 
already is taken, but the child is not alive. It is of course the surviving child and not the birth 
that is of interest for the family. Total number of living children is another option, but it 
excludes children that might have grown up before they died.  
To exemplify: a family, having one son, might want another because of insurance against the 
possibility that one might not survive. If they get another son who dies at very early age, there 
is a possibility that the family will continue to try to get the second son. At some age, the 
parents might not replace the child, if it dies. This age is difficult to determine, but I expect 
that when a child has survived his or her first five years, it is unlikely that the household will 
try to replace the child. Under-five mortality is also the usual limit used to compute “child-
mortality”. This threshold could be subject to change, especially as the fertility-rate is 
declining.  
Another problem regarding the dependent variable is the way age affects fertility. It has two 
effects. One is that you get more children as your life evolves, the same individual will have 
more children when she is 30 than she had when she was 18. The other way age affects 
fertility is through the fact that the fertility-rate in Nepal have declined dramatically the last 
years. This means that, on average, older respondents will have more children than younger 
respondents for any period of life. 
One way to partially deal with the problem, would be to exclude the youngest respondents. It 
is also possible to use a combination of age and fertility as the dependent variable, e.g. by 
using the age-specific fertility rates (ASFR)31
The dependent variable used, is based on the variable labeled “total children ever born” in the 
dataset. It has been modified, so it includes all living children, in addition to those that have 
died, but survived their first five living years. Age will be included on the right-hand-side of 
. This could capture both differences within and 
between 5-year cohorts, but the ASFR is calculated on an aggregate level (in the DHS-reports, 
per 1000 women), and does not easily convert to individual level. 
                                                 
31 ASFR is measured as the number of births divided by total women-years in a specific age group (Ministry of 
Health and Population[Nepal] 2007b: 63) 
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the regression equation as an independent variable. I use both the results from the all married 
selection and the results from the selection where only the respondents with at least one and 
two children are included. The all married selection also has weaknesses: many of the 
respondents with few children will be getting more children, and this effect is only partly 
captured in the age-variable. Comparing it with the other selections, gives me the opportunity 
to find out which coefficients that are clearly biased because of this effect. This partly solves 
the problem regarding how to isolate the two age-effects, and is in my opinion the best 
solution to the problem.  
4.4.2 Independent variables 
The education and occupation variables are included for both respondents and their husbands. 
A word of caution is necessary with regards to the husband-variables. They are not collected 
from the men’s dataset, and are thus not from the interviews of the men themselves, but from 
the women’s answer to what their men do for a living and how educated their men are. Only 
approximately 4500 men are interviewed, and all of them are not necessarily husbands of the 
respondents. Merging the datasets and including variables from the men’s dataset would 
therefore largely reduce my sample. The cost of doing this is the potential for incorrect 
reporting, especially are husbands education not necessarily known by the wife. The literacy 
variable is also based on the respondents’ ability to read a certain sentence. This is obviously 
not available for men in my model. However, the gains from using data from all respondents 
are in my opinion greater than the cost of a possible inaccurate reporting. 
Variables of special interest 
Income / wealth 
I expect that the richer the family is, the fewer children they will have. This is a direct 
interpretation of Becker’s assumption that as income increases, the demand of number of 
children will decrease, and the demand for quality will increase. 
As discussed using the Quality-Quantity model, higher income can make the preferences 
change towards spending more on each child. Even though demand for all goods increases 
with increased wage, if the price of quality is sufficiently high, higher income can lead to 
fewer children. The opportunity-cost effect is also important, but I cannot separate between 
male and female wealth, and I do expect men to be the main contributor to the family 
economy. More children means less time spent on each, so is unlikely that more money leads 
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to more children, as this can result in lower quality for each, unless much more money is 
allocated to children’s consume. 
There are no income-variables in the dataset, but there is a wealth indicator. The indicator 
divides the respondents into five quintiles, ranging from poorest to richest. The index is based 
on assets, housing characteristics and sanitation and water facilities. The different components 
are weighted using the Principle Component Analysis32
Education 
. I have changed the variable into five 
dummy-variables. I use this wealth indicator as a measurement of wealth and income, as I 
expect firstly that income and wealth in general is highly correlated and secondly that assets 
and housing characteristics is a good indicator of family’s income levels. 
I include education is this section, as education is a good indicator of income-opportunities. 
Education affects fertility in multiple ways. 
Mothers’ education might increase the opportunity cost of child-bearing because higher 
education lead to higher income opportunities. There is a possibility that increased income 
make women work less, because with a higher wage, the same income-level can be reached 
with fewer working-hours, hence having the opportunity to raise more children. I do, 
however, expect the income effect to dominate the substitution effect, so that higher income 
leads to higher labor-supply. 
Mother’s education delays the birth of the first children, implying that the total fecund period 
will be smaller.  This assumes that women will wait to get pregnant until she has finished her 
education. Choe et al (2005), finds that education to some degree leads to later marriage and 
that early marriage is connected to early motherhood. The paper does however not say 
anything about the relationship between early marriage/motherhood and total children. It is a 
plausible assumption in my opinion to expect early motherhood to be correlated with getting 
many children, also made by Mason (1987). 
                                                 
32 Principle Components Analysis (PCA) is a statistical method used to reduce the number of variables if you 
have many correlated variables that are thematically related to each other. The method is used to simplify the 
interpretation process or as a means to deal with multicolinearity (correlation between the independent 
variables).  If you have a set of related indicators that are highly correlated, you can summarize these to form one 
variable. Each indicator is given a weight and these weights are computed in such a way, that the variation of the 
collected indicators is maximized. Stated differently, the squared correlation between the summarized indicators 
and the original variables is maximized (Dunteman 1989). In this case, it makes more sense to have one 
composite variable of different wealth-indicators, than to include all variables concerning housing, assets etc.   
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Desire for more educated children increases the cost of children, making households switch 
from quantity to quality of children. This will work through the household’s utility function if 
education leads to higher utility of high-quality children relative to quantity. The third point is 
important for a society in change, like Nepal is today. Many children growing up today have 
parents that expect them to have more education than the parents themselves. Education is 
expensive, so if a family wants educated children and have limited economic resources, they 
will have to limit the number of children33
I expect education to increase awareness of possible negative consequences of having large 
families. I also expect more education to lead to better knowledge about contraception and 
better ability to get hold of and understand information about issues related to family 
planning. This not necessarily only apply to individual education-level, but can also have an 
effect if the community gets higher educated.  
.  
Education can also help to empower women. Higher educated women might be better able to 
stand up against pressure from husbands and in-laws. When it comes to husband’s education, 
the effect on fertility does not work through the opportunity cost effect. The changes in 
preferences and attitudes is likely to change for men in the same way as for women, but all in 
all, I expect that men’s education are less important than women’s. 
In the dataset, education is reported as whether the respondent has none, primary, secondary 
or higher education. There is also during the interviews performed a test where the respondent 
is asked to read a certain sentence. Dummies are used for no education, primary education, 
secondary education and higher education. I also use one variable for those who have no 
formal education, but are not analphabets, to test for the effect of informal education. 
Husbands’ education is reported by the respondents (their wives); no education, primary, 
secondary and higher education. 
Female autonomy 
Nepal is a society where women have significantly lower status than men. Females are for 
instance less likely to get education and jobs than men are (Ministry of Health and Population 
[Nepal] 2007b). They also carry most of the burden of household-duties, including caring for 
and raising children. Regarding education and work (especially work outside the agricultural 
sector), increased female autonomy will increase the opportunity cost of children if female 
                                                 
33 Public education is free in Nepal, but books and uniforms are not. Many also prefer (non-free) private schools, 
and having children in school means that they are not helping out at home or contributing to the family economy. 
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empowerment increase the probability that women get education and jobs. This effect will 
however probably be captured in the education and work variables.  
If the wife in the family faces greater costs of getting children than the husband because of the 
heavier burden during the pregnancy and the up-bringing process, women might have stronger 
preferences for limiting the number of children than men34
As a measurement of female autonomy, I have chosen the variable labeled “Final say on visits 
to family and relatives”. In the questionnaire, the respondent is asked about who have the final 
say on the family’s visits to family and relatives. The alternatives given to the respondents are 
“respondent alone”, “respondent and husband/partner”, “husband/partner alone”, “someone 
else” and “other”. The different responses are coded as dummies. 
. If this is the case, then I will 
assume that higher degree of female autonomy will give the women more power over 
contraception usage and other decisions affecting fertility. In the theory chapter, multiple 
levels on which female autonomy can affect fertility were presented. Women also experience 
substantial pressure by husband and in-laws when it comes to delivering the desired number 
of children with the desired gender (sons) (Crehpa: 2007). Thus, I expect female autonomy to 
have a negative relationship with fertility.  
The variable has limitations. For some families, the decision about family-visits can be 
irrelevant as a measurement for relative power. However, given the influence the man and the 
in-laws (in particular the mother in law) has in the average Nepalese family, I find it plausible 
to assume that in cases where the wife has the last say on visits,  the women also has more 
power in general compared to the cases where the man has the last say.  
Background variables, other Socioeconomic and Geographical Variables 
Age 
The independent variable age is expected to be positively related to number of children. The 
reason is twofold, as mentioned on page 41. Each woman gets children as her life evolves, 
and older women lived in a period where higher fertility was normal. 
I have also included age-squared to account for non-linearity. There is a possibility that this 
could be positive, if the second effect of age on fertility is very strong, but this is unlikely. I 
                                                 
34 17 percent state that their husband wants more children than themselves, 7 percent want more children than 
their husbands. This corresponds with ideal number of children, which is slightly higher for men than for women 
(2.8 against 2.5). 
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expect this to be negative, indicating that number of children one gets is increasing but on a 
diminishing rate as age increases. The intersection between the first and second-order term 
should be somewhere after 49 years (the age of the oldest respondents), because I do not 
expect older respondents to have fewer children.  
Marriage 
Sex outside marriage is not socially accepted in Nepal and it is unheard of to get children 
without being married, and few do. Marriage duration is expected to have much of the same 
effect as age. I also include a second-order term for the same reason as for age. In addition to 
not getting children before marriage, it is usual to get children quite early after marriage. 14 
percent get children during their first year of marriage, 36 percent in the second and 21 
percent in the third. 38 percent are getting pregnant with their first child during the first year 
of marriage (giving birth between the eighth and twentieth month after marriage). Nepalese 
women also generally marry early. According to the DHS data, 85 percent of Nepalese 
women married before the age of 20. This is based on all respondents, from 15-49 years, so if 
this has changed the last 20 years, the data does not capture this change, but comparing with 
the 1996 dataset, there seem to be very little change. 
The variable is expected to have a positive relationship with fertility and the squared-term to 
have a negative relationship. Women get children early, but many also stop getting children at 
an early stage. As contraception is getting more widespread, available and accepted, it is 
easier to stop getting children after reaching the desired number. This early stop will probably 
make the first and second order terms to intersect early. 
Caste/Ethnicity 
In Nepal, ethnicity is closely related with income, education opportunities and occupation. I 
expect that the lowest castes get more children than higher castes, but that the effect is related 
to indicators such as income and education and that some of it might diminish when this is 
controlled for. 
The Muslims are outside the Hindu caste system but are regarded to be at a low level in the 
social hierarchy. I expect them to get more children than the non-Muslims, as is usual to find 
in comparable countries (Morgan et al. 2002). One hypothesis is that Muslims do not have the 
same access to contraceptives because of social constraints; it is not socially desired to use 
contraceptives. Bhalotra et al. (2010) suggests that Muslims have better maternal health, thus 
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lowering the risk for fetal death, hence potentially increasing number of surviving children, 
especially since they do not use contraception35
If castes show some significant effects it may be due to discrimination in the labor market. If 
low-castes do not expect their children to have any chances to enter the labor-market due to 
discrimination, the rate of return from investment in quality will be low. These parents will 
consequently have a relative lower demand for quality than other parents from other castes, all 
other things being. Another explanation could be that there are social structures and norms 
that make some groups getting more or fewer children than other. 
.  
I have sorted the ethnicity-variable in the original dataset into 8 dummy variables. These are: 
• Brahmin and Chetri, high castes 
• Hill Ethnic, Ethnic groups  with origins from the Hill and Mountain zone 
• Terai Middle, Middle and high castes with origins from the Terai zone 
• Terai Ethnic, Ethnic groups with origins from the Terai zone 
• Hill Dalits, low castes with origins from Hill and Mountain zone 
• Terai Dalits, low castes with origins from the Terai zone 
• Muslims 
• Other 
The reason for sorting the ethnicity in this particular way has to do with capturing the most 
interesting differences for my purpose, which is to test whether position in the hierarchy is a 
determinant for fertility. In the dataset, there are 75 castes / ethnic groups. Most of the groups 
have fewer than 100 observations. This means that many of the groups are impossible to use 
for statistical purposes without sorting, and the interpretation would be challenging. A more 
in-depth analysis of the differences between the ethnic groups in Nepal, would have called for 
a different approach. The sorting is done in accordance with Gurung (2006).  
The sorting is made in this particular way to collect groups that are relatively similar. Dalits 
are low-castes, the ethnic groups follow, Middle castes are ranked higher and Brahmins and 
Chetris are the traditional highest castes. As commented in the background chapter, castes 
from the Hills and Mountains regard themselves as higher ranked than those from the Terai 
zone.  
                                                 
35 20 percent Muslims, compared to 45 percent total uses contraception (DHS Data 2006). Some underreporting 
should also be expected here, but there is some evidence that the usage is lower among the Muslims. 
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Urban/Rural 
In a global and historical perspective, urban families are usually smaller than rural families. 
Families with farms will possibly face lower costs in raising children because children might 
contribute to the farm from a relative young age. In general, food is cheaper for farmers. This 
effect is likely to diminish when the farming industry is modernized. The expense of sending 
children to school might be higher for families in rural areas, as the population is less dense, 
and the travel-cost increases with distance to school36
The fertility rate is much lower in the urban areas than in rural
. In this sense, rural families might at 
some level face higher costs of raising children (Becker 1991). Manual labor is still very 
important in Nepal’s agricultural sector and I expect rural families to have more children than 
urban families. 
37
In addition to the urban/rural distinction, I use a Terai-dummy. There are differences between 
the zones when it comes to number of children, so it is definitely worth testing. Are there 
characteristics with the geographical areas in themselves that make these differences, or are 
these differences are connected to differences in the other independent variables? One 
possible reason for households to get more children in the hills and mountains can be that it 
requires more labor to run the farms in the steep terrain, than in the flat Terai, and at the same 
time, the labor market is less developed. Also, expenses to schooling may be higher, due to 
higher transportation cost. 
. The effect of the rural 
variable is likely to be associated with occupational status. I also expect education and income 
to be lower in rural areas than in urban, and there can be different norms present in the 
different areas. However, it is likely that there are more traditional views on family and 
fertility in the rural areas. If attitudes regarding family are changing in Nepal, this change will 
probably take place earlier in the urban than in the rural areas. Thus, living in the rural area 
can be expected to have a positive relationship with fertility even when the other variables are 
accounted for. 
Occupation/Work 
Nepal is an agricultural society. According to the DHS data, 73 percent of women are 
employed in the agricultural sector, and 41 percent of their husbands are the same. There are 
obviously differences within the agricultural sector. Some are large landowners, some are 
                                                 
36 In transportation cost, time spent in getting to and from the school is included, as the children cannot take part 
in household activities or wage labor during this period. 
37 3.3 in rural and 2.1 in urban areas (Ministry of Health and Population [Nepal] 2007a) 
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farm labor and others agricultural workers. In other words, it is difficult to make assumptions 
based on the agricultural sector variable alone. Families with a small farm might have a 
greater need for a big family if they need help on the farm or in the house. Females employed 
in other sectors might also face heavier losses when having children, especially if the wage is 
higher, hence higher opportunity cost for activities that includes being away from work, the 
same effect as higher education is expected to have.  The variables used in the empirical 
analysis is coded as dummies for those (respondent/respondents husbands) working in 
agricultural sector, service sector, industrial sector, those who do not work and the cases 
where the respondent’s job is not in any of the questionnaires categories. 
Siblings 
Siblings refer to the respondents’ siblings, and I test whether respondent who have had/has 
more than 4 siblings get more children than others. It may be expected that women growing 
up in a big family are more likely to get many children themselves; hence I expect the dummy 
to be positive. 
Family Planning and the Availability of Health services  
I include two variables concerning family planning and health facilities. The first one regards 
respondents living in a district where the Family Planning Association of Nepal (FPAN)38
                                                 
38 FPAN is one of the biggest family planning NGO’s in Nepal, contributing to 25-30 percent of the family 
planning programs in Nepal. 
 had 
6 or more projects in 2008. The argument behind including the variable runs like this: districts 
where an NGO such as FPAN is represented with many projects; information and knowledge 
about family planning should be easily accessible. I expect respondents in “FPAN districts” to 
have fewer children than others. However, the districts where FPAN are operating are 
probably not selected randomly. One possibility is that they choose districts with high 
fertility, where they are most severely needed. Another possibility is that they operate in 
regions that are easily accessible. Thus, this variable must be cautiously analyzed. 
Geographically, FPAN is most active in Terai and Hills zones, and in the eastern and central 
part, the parts of Nepal which is most densely populated. Variables controlling for regional 
differences are also being used, so if there still is a significant effect of the variable, this can 
indicate that family planning projects can have some effect. This variable is constructed by 
information gathered from the FPAN web-page and the 2008 report (which I got access to in 
Kathmandu). This is the only variable that is not in the original dataset.  
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Contraception usage is regarded as one of the main reasons behind the decline in fertility in 
Nepal. According to the three latest DHS surveys, contraception usage has increased from 28 
percent to 48 percent39
The other variable is respondents stating that the distance to the nearest health facility makes 
it “a big problem” to get medical help. My hypothesis is that the nearest health facility for 
most people will be where they seek advice on family planning. The price and effort to get 
information and treatment regarding family planning thus increases when the distance to the 
nearest health facility increases. It can have the effect that the newborns in the community get 
less medical attention, leading to higher mortality rate for children. Further, this could lead to 
increased fertility rate because of expectations of lower survival rate for the children. The 
female community health volunteers (FCHV) is an important source of information regarding 
family planning, and can effectively deliver information even if the distance to the closest 
health facility is far away
 (Karki and Krishna 2008). Better access and more knowledge about 
contraception and family planning is without doubt an important tool to reduce the population 
growth if the population gets more children than they want. Historically, in most places, the 
fertility rate has been below the maximum reproduction possibilities. Without modern 
contraception, population has to some degree been controlled by people’s preferences for 
fertility (Becker 1991). Accordingly, it is important not to exaggerate the effect of 
contraception itself, but in combination with changing norms and information, it can certainly 
be effective in helping people meet their desired fertility levels.  
40
Electricity 
. However, big distances can also make the working conditions 
worse for the FCHV, so how much they compensate for this is difficult to say. I expect that 
problems concerning the distance to the nearest health post to have a positive relationship 
with fertility. 
To some extent, electricity is accounted for, as it is included in the wealth-index. About half 
of the Nepalese population has electricity, a sharp increase from below 20 percent in 1996. 
Herrin (1976) investigates the link between fertility and electricity with the background that 
electrification boosts socioeconomic development. One possible effect of electricity is that it 
starts a modernization process leading to easier access to information and better health 
facilities. I would suppose that most of the electricity effect is controlled for by education and 
income and thus diminish when those variables are included. Electricity can however be 
                                                 
39 Current usage. 
40 For information about the FCHV, see the Chapter 2. 
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introduced in a region or a village and then be provided to all inhabitants regardless of 
socioeconomic status. Thus, it can be an indicator of different norms, if having any significant 
effect. Another and less “academic” assumption is that families with electricity and light to a 
lesser degree participate in “child-producing activities”.  
Testing the preference for boys as a natural experiment 
The assumption 
In Nepal, sons are in general preferred to daughters. One way to get an indication of the 
magnitude of this preference is to compare the average number of children if the two first 
born are boys (3.17) with the same number if the two first born are girls (3.93).    
The testing of the boy-preference is done by including variables containing information about 
the sex of the first (two) born child (ren). The dataset will at the same time of course be 
reduced to contain only the families with at least one and two children, respectively. I expect 
to find that families who get a girl as their first child will get more children than those who 
have a boy as their first child. This picture will probably be even clearer for the families with 
girls as their two first born children. I use two dummies for the gender of the first born, and 
three for the two first born (two boys, two girls or one of each). These are not included in the 
regression with the all married sample, but in the two other samples. 
Natural experiment 
Natural experiments are “Situations where the forces of nature or governmental policy have 
conspired to produce an environment somewhat akin to a randomized experiment” (Angrist 
and Krueger 2001). In a random experiment, an effect is tested using two groups, one 
treatment group and control group (Wooldridge 2006). Testing the effect of a medication 
serves as a good example; among the participants of the test, one group is randomly assigned 
to get the real medicine, while the other gets a placebo (“false” medication). Only if there are 
significant better effects among the treatment group compared to the control group, can 
conclusions be drawn in the direction that the medication is effective. Such tests are usually 
not available for or applicable to economic research. It is impossible, or at least highly 
impractical, to construct two groups to be involved in an experiment where they are randomly 
given different income levels to investigate the effect of income on fertility. However, 
sometimes one is able to use exogenous phenomena from real life to approximate a 
randomized experiment. If a certain policy in implemented, one can use data from two 
random groups in the time before and the time after the implementation to find the effect of 
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the question in interest. For my case, the gender of the child born is a natural experiment. 
Those getting two girls first can be considered the randomly selected treatment group, while 
those getting two boys first are the control group. If preference for boys is present, the 
treatment group should get significantly more children than the control group. The advantage 
of natural experiments is that they are not affected by the other variables in the model. A 
discussion regarding causality and natural experiments is also done in chapter 5, as is the rest 
of my Empirical analysis, where the hypotheses above are tested. 
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5. Findings 
The Regressions are based on the empirical model, using OLS and Poisson Regression. The 
estimation equations are found in the empirical methodology section. All models are 
presented in appendix 3, and the most interesting OLS results in table 4 below41
Goodness-of-fit, the Models and the Presentation of the Results 
. 
The R-squared in the OLS analysis is between 0.42 and 0.55 (Table 4), indicating that around 
half of the variations in fertility can be explained by the variables in the model. The Poisson 
Pseudo R-squared is not reported with the survey-command, so regressions without the survey 
command are done to check the pseudo R-squared, giving results that range from 0.08 to 0.18 
(Appendix 3c) These do not, however, necessarily correspond, but the low McFadden R-
squared indicates that the model is inferior to the OLS model. A chi-squared test gives some 
indication that the Poisson distribution might be correct, and the Negative Binomial 
Regression gives indications of equidispersion42
Model 1 in Table 4 is the regression with the all married sample, Model 2 is the at least one 
child sample and Model 3 means the selection including only women with at least two 
children. The best model is probably Model 3. It does not have the largest R-squared, but 
intuitively, it has some advantages over Model 1 and 2. In Model 1, a large number of 
respondents are early in their part of life where they get children. This number decreases in 
model 2 and 3. All 3 models are used as my findings, as it is useful for the sake of 
comparison, but unless otherwise stated, the results are from Model 3. 
. There are no sign that the Negative 
Binomial Model should be preferred over the Poisson, in fact, since equidispersion is present, 
the Negative Binomial is an ordinary Poisson regression, as seen from equal coefficients 
(Appendix 3d).  
The reasons for choosing to present the OLS results rather than the Poisson results are 
threefold. First, the R-squared issue already discussed, a large R-squared indicates that the 
model fits quite well. Perhaps the main reason is that the Poisson results can also be 
challenging to interpret, so the OLS results are more convenient for the sake of interpretation 
and discussion. Furthermore, the results are quite similar, so the discussion is not greatly 
                                                 
41 The occupation variables, geography dummies and the health facility is excluded, but is included in the models 
in the Appendix.  
42 In the Negative Binomial Regression it is constructed an overdispersion parameter. This being equal to zero 
implies an equidispersed correct Poisson distribution. The parameter is not significantly different from zero.
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affected by the choice of model. In addition, the assumptions behind the Poisson model seem 
too strong, especially those regarding independent and stationary increments. As Nguyen-
Dinh (1997) points out, there is correlation between previous and succeeding births, however 
not systematically. He estimates the correlation between births by doing a regression analysis 
with number of births in previous age-intervals as independent variables. Births are according 
to his findings positively correlated for women younger than 34, but negatively correlated for 
older respondents. The normality assumption behind the OLS model probably also is too 
strong, so that the choice of model is by no means trivial. In the appendix, the Poisson Results 
are presented using Incident Rate Ratios (IRR). An IRR of 0.9 means that a one unit change in 
the independent variable causes the dependent variable to change with the ratio of 0.9. The 
OLS results are straightforward; a one unit change in the independent variable causes the 
dependent variable to change with the size of the coefficient. 
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Variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev 
 
Whole Sample At least one child sample At least two children sample 
          (Model-1) (Model-2) (Model-3) 
Dependent Variables 
    
Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Number of children (Model-1) childvar 2,68 1,85 
  
  
        Number of children >0 (Model-2) childvar_1 3,02 1,68 
    
        Number of children >1 (Model-3) childvar_2 3,50 1,52 
    Independent Variables 
       First born child is a girl firstgirl 0,45 0,50 
  
 0.314*** 
 
      
 (0.035) 
 The two first born children  are one boy and one girl oneofeach 0,63 0,48 
   
 0.269*** 
 
      
(0.044) 
The two first born children are both girls girldummy 0,18 0,39 
   
 0.711*** 
 
      
(0.049) 
Age age 31,12 9,10 
 
 0.115***  0.114***  0.115*** 
 
    
(0.025) (0.028) (0.031) 
Age squared  age2 1051,08 591,75 
 
-0.0019*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** 
 
    
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Duration of marriage mardur 13,84 9,35 
 
 0.205***  0.156***  0.096*** 
 
    
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) 
Duration on marriage squared mardur2 278,88 302,62 
 
-0.0023*** -0.0014*** -0.0001 
 
    
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
The second poorest wealth-quintile poorer 0,19 0,39 
 
-0.182*** -0.205*** -0.222*** 
 
    
(0.069) (0.068) (0.078) 
The middle wealth-quintile middle 0,19 0,39 
 
-0.300*** -0.344*** -0.341*** 
 
    
(0.074) (0.080) (0.084) 
The second richest wealth-quintile richer 0,20 0,40 
 
-0.350*** -0.394*** -0.386*** 
 
    
(0.078) (0.084) (0.089) 
The richest wealth-quintile richest 0,20 0,40 
 
-0.478*** -0.509*** -0.506*** 
(Reference group = Poorest wealth-quintile) 
    
(0.094) (0.100) (0.097) 
Has electricity electricity 0,50 0,50 
 
-0.129** -0.101* -0.143** 
 
    
(0.052) (0.056) (0.056) 
No education, but can read edu00 0,12 0,32 
 
-0.218*** -0.220*** -0.223*** 
 
    
(0.050) (0.046) (0.045) 
Primary Education edu1 0,17 0,38 
 
-0.159*** -0.179*** -0.220*** 
          (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) 
Secondary Education edu2 
   
-0,005 -0,136** -0,169*** 
 
    
(0,049) (0,056) (0,061) 
Table 4: Summary of estimation results 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev 
 
Whole Sample At least one child sample At least two children sample 
          (Model-1) (Model-2) (Model-3) 
Higher Education edu3 
   
-0,048 -0,177* -0,277** 
(Reference group= No education, cannot read) 
    
(0,092) (0,097) (0,118) 
Primary Educaion (husband) hedu1 0,27 0,44 
 
 0.028  0.014  0.001 
 
    
(0.055) (0.053) (0.049) 
Secondary Education  (husband) hedu2 0,39 0,49 
 
-0.056 -0.093* -0.124** 
 
    
(0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
Higher Education (husband) hedu3 0,09 0,29 
 
-0.209*** -0.296*** -0.417*** 
(Reference group= No education) 
    
(0.068) (0.071) (0.072) 
Someone else has last say on visits to family and 
relatives elsesay 0,21 0,41 
 
-0.259*** -0.252*** -0.152*** 
 
    
(0.047) (0.045) (0.050) 
Husband and wife have last say… jointsay 0,25 0,43 
 
-0.0504 -0.0881* -0.148*** 
 
    
(0.053) (0.051) (0.053) 
Respondent (wife) has last say… respsay 0,23 0,42 
 
-0.215*** -0.248*** -0.239*** 
(Reference group= Husband has last…) 
 
    
(0.049)  (0.049) (0.055) 
Brahmin / Chetri BC 0,36 0,48 
 
 0.0120  0.0366  0.0571 
 
    
(0.093) (0.092) (0.090) 
Hill Dalit HD 0,09 0,29 
 
 0.161  0.191*  0.243** 
 
    
(0.105) (0.105) (0.109) 
Hill Ethnic HE 0,24 0,43 
 
 0.094  0.111  0.195** 
 
    
(0.095) (0.094) (0.097) 
Terai Dalit TD 0,04 0,20 
 
 0.035  0.019  0.0140 
 
    
(0.098) (0.102) (0.110) 
Muslim MS 0,03 0,18 
 
 0.482***  0.545***  0.591*** 
 
    
(0.136) (0.151) (0.157) 
Terai Middle Caste TM 0,12 0,32 
 
 0.127  0.181**  0.211*** 
(Reference group= Terai Ethnic) 
    
(0.078) (0.079) (0.080) 
Live in region with 6 or more FPAN projects in 2008 projectdummy 0,47 0,50 
 
-0.043 -0.068 -0.111* 
 
    
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) 
Respondent has/had more than 4 siblings  sibdummy 0,43 0,50 
 
 0.066**  0.062**  0.082** 
     
(0.028) (0.028) (0.033) 
 
Constant 
   
-0.736** -0.451  0.080 
     
(0.322) (0.366) (0.447) 
        
 
Observations 
   
 8,140  7,412  6,083 
  R-squared        0.546  0.502  0.424 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 (continued) 
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5.1 The Analysis 
The analysis is divided into three parts, first presenting the results of the main research 
question. The gender-preference results and lastly the other variables follow. 
5.1.1 The Money or the Autonomy – the Main Analysis  
Wealth 
From Table 4, it is observed that all wealth-quintiles are significantly different from the 
reference group on the 1 percent significance level. Wald-tests show that richer is also 
different from richest43
Education 
. The Wald-tests are ambiguous when testing the wealth-dummies 
against each other, but richest is different from the others, middle is significantly different 
from poorest, and richer is different from poorer. In other words, even though not all dummies 
are different from each others, the pattern that higher wealth equals fewer children is clear if 
one wealth-level is skipped (comparing poorest to middle, poorer to richer and middle to 
richest). From the OLS regressions above, we see that the richest have around half a child less 
than the poorest in every model. The Nepali households among the richest quintile get half a 
child fewer than the poorest, all other things being equal. The coefficients increases at a 
roughly constant rate as wealth increases, but there seem to be larger difference between the 
poorest and the second poorest, than between any other “neighboring” groups. In other words, 
the poorest group stands out as the group that differs most from the other. This could be 
interpreted in the direction than the poorest are unable to invest money in their children, hence 
demanding a high number, but as soon a certain living standard is met, being able to invest 
just something in the children, largely affect demand for quantity. When this threshold is met, 
the negative effect of wealth on fertility is still present, but with less magnitude.  
The educational dummies leave us with a somewhat unclear picture. Female education seems 
to have some effect on fertility, but mostly for low educational levels. All education levels are 
significant and negative relative to the reference group “no education, cannot read” variable 
(Table 4), but they are not different from each other (Appendix 4). The expected effect would 
be that higher education means possibilities for higher income, hence higher opportunity cost 
of getting children. This effect is only partly present. One reason for this unexpected result 
can be that most women (73 percent) are employed in the agricultural sector. In addition to 
                                                 
43 See appendix 4. 
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those, 16 percent have no work. This means than only approximately 10 percent of Nepalese 
women are working outside the agricultural sector. This can be interpreted in a direction that 
job-opportunities for women are slim, regardless of education. From table 4 it is found that 
women with higher education have around 0.28 less number of children as uneducated, 
illiterate women in Model 3. The number is approximately the same for uneducated, literate 
women (0.22). Higher education is significantly different from the reference groups on the 
five percent level, while uneducated literate, on the one percent level. The level of education 
seems to be irrelevant, while the ability to read/or just to have some education has an effect. 
This corresponds to some degree with the effect of wealth, where the effect was relatively 
most notable on low levels.  
Regarding men’s education (here, the reference group is simply no education as no literacy 
test is available), both positive and negative relationship could be argued to exist. The 
opportunity-cost effect is not present for men, so they might have higher demand for both 
quality and quantity. I would, however expect higher education to be negatively correlated 
with number of children for men as well. This is also what is observed from the regressions, 
but while women’s education was only significant for low levels, the husband education 
variables show a different pattern. They’re significant for intermediate and higher levels, but 
not for low levels. This is an indication of preference for higher-quality children from families 
with high-educated parents, as predicted trough the Quality-Quantity trade-off effect. As seem 
in Table 4, women whose men have higher education get between 0.2 and 0.42 fewer children 
than women whose men are uneducated. Secondary education is also significant in Model 2 
and 3. Men’s higher education is actually more important than women’s44
 
. This is probably 
related to the relatively limited job-opportunities for women with higher education. Men’s 
higher education, compared to the reference group, is nearly as important as the highest 
wealth-level, and is among largest coefficients in the analysis. This raise some questions 
related to the later discussion about power-relationships in the household as well. My 
interpretation of the importance of men’s education is that higher demand for quality (relative 
to quantity) is highly correlated with men’s education. This also seems to be more important 
than the opportunity-cost effect, though a more detailed analysis of the relationships with the 
labor market should be done to draw this conclusion. 
                                                 
44 Note: The reference groups are slightly different. 
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Female Autonomy 
There is a negative relationship between number of children and the wife in the family having 
the last say on visits to family or relatives, compared with families where the husband have 
this power. Females with higher level of autonomy are in my opinion more likely to have 
more bargaining power in issues regarding family size and contraception. Family Planning 
issues are often discussed in mother-groups in villages, without the presence of men. I believe 
that more autonomous women are more likely to i) use contraception (i.e. get sterilized) 
without the husband’s knowledge or ii) pursue the husband to agree that one of them use 
contraception. “Someone else having the last say” is also significantly different and lower 
than “husband having last say”. In Model 3, all variables are significant. “Someone else” is 
probably either the respondents own family or the in-laws, most likely the mother in law. The 
question is then whether the mother in law’s interests is the same as the respondents’. The 
strong negative correlation with fertility, compared with where the husband has the last say, 
leaves an impression that any female power in the family is more important than which 
female in the household has the power. The main conclusion drawn is that in families where 
the husband has the last say, there are more children. The differences between the other 
variables are difficult to say something clear about. The effect is as large as -0.24 in Model 3, 
larger, for example, than female higher education. The variable is significant on the one 
percent level 
5.1.2 The Gender variables – a Natural experiment 
In Nepal, like its neighboring countries India and China and other Asian countries, the gender 
inequality has more severe consequences for the population and individuals than in most 
developed countries. The following shows that there is a strong preference for boys over girls 
among Nepalese parents.  
Table 4 gives a clear picture; the gender variables are significant. The second OLS model 
shows that families getting a boy as their first child get on average 0.31 children fewer than 
families having a girl as their first child. Moreover, families having two boys (and no 
daughters) get 0.27 children fewer than those having one of each sex. Families where both 
their first and second born is a girl get 0.71 children more than in families with two boys. This 
is an indication that supports the impression I got from my interviews. When I asked the 
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FCHV what advice they usually gave to families regarding family size, the usual answer was: 
“Get at most two, but it’s OK to try once more if you have gotten two daughters”.  
These data clearly shows that gender preferences to a large extent affect family size and 
fertility behavior in Nepal. Affecting the perception that boys are more “worth” than girls 
might be an instrument to further decrease the fertility. There is a normative aspect to this as 
well; gender equality is a goal in its own matter, regardless of the population issue and the 
preference for boys can have serious social consequences. This will be further discussed later.  
5.1.3 The other Socioeconomic Variables and the Background Variables 
Age and Marriage Duration 
Both age and marriage duration is both significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, their 
respective second-order terms are mostly negative. However, the values of the coefficients for 
age have an “unwanted” property; 
𝑦𝑦 = 0.115𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 − 0.0016𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒2 ⟹ 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦
𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
= 0.115 − 0.0036𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = 0 ⇒ 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 ≈ 36 
This should imply that women get more children until they are 36 years, from which age they 
begin to get fewer children. This seems unlikely, and I do not see any good reasons women 
older than 36 should have fewer children than those younger than 36. But the marriage 
duration variable has to be accounted for in the interpretation. If two respondents have been 
married the same number of years, but one is older than the other, the oldest of them will have 
fewer children. If the marriage duration variable is removed, the age-variable acts in the 
expected manner. Another point of interest is that the second-order term of marriage duration 
is insignificant in model 3. This implies a linear connection between marriage duration and 
number of children for women with at least two children. 
Job/Occupation 
The discussion about women in the Nepalese job-market was introduced in the interpretation 
of the education coefficients, stating that few women are employed outside the agricultural 
sector. The Job/Occupation dummies are found in Appendix 3. 
The reference group is respondents working in the agricultural sector. The only significant 
variable is the service-sector variable and it gets less important from Model 1 to Model 3. By 
far the largest group in this dummy is “traders/business man”, followed by “teacher” and 
“private entrepreneurs/proprietors” (the three groups accounting for approximately 75 percent 
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of the service-sector employed). Women employed in the service sector probably have higher 
wages than those employed in agriculture and they certainly have higher level of education. 
This supports the quality-quantity-tradeoff, but since the coefficient is quite small, it is 
difficult to conclude regarding occupation’s effect. Service sector employed might be 
significant because of young women working in the service sector have been exposed to 
urban values. The young respondents working in the service sector might have better jobs 
than older respondents in the same group, and that could be the reason why the coefficient is 
getting smaller and less significant. The women employed in “not specified” sectors is 
significant in the “at least two” sample, but this is based on only 4 respondents. 
Husbands work is not significant. The only exception is husbands without work, but the group 
is too small for the results to be reliable45
Caste/Ethnicity 
. As with education, I would expect that women’s 
occupational status is more important than men’s. However, men should contribute in the 
same way when it comes to providing food to the family, but evidence from the models 
indicate that this effect is not present. Another reason could be that since men in general are 
more important contributors to the family economy, the effect of income is accounted for 
through the wealth-variables.  
The reference group is Terai ethnic group, ethnic groups with origins from the Terai region. 
This group is normally below the Terai middle caste-group, but above the Hill Dalit’s in the 
caste-hierarchy. As observed, the only significant variable in Model 1 is the Muslims, while 
all groups except Brahmin/Chetri and Terai Dalit are significant in Model 3.  
The first is in accordance with my expectations; all other things being equal, Muslims get 
more children than other ethnic groups. The Wald-tests also show significant differences 
between Muslims and all other groups. In my own interviews, many of my respondents 
pointed to the Muslims as a group that they would expect to have “more children than 
themselves”. Unfortunately, I was not able to interview any Muslims myself, hence I did not 
get any personal experience regarding their own reflections about what seems to be a clear 
pattern; Muslims in Nepal get significantly more children than other Nepalese. Muslims get 
over half a child more than the reference group in all models in Table 4. 
                                                 
45 Fewer than one percent of the respondents has husbands without work. 
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Regarding the other significant Caste-dummies, the interpretation is somewhat challenging. 
Difference in living standard and education is accounted for, so differences between castes 
can best be explained by different norms across ethnical groups. Two of the significant 
groups, Terai Middle and Hill Ethnic, is regarded by many as higher in the system than the 
reference group, while Dalits (often referred to as “untouchables”) is below the Ethnic groups, 
but they have the same sign, and the coefficients have almost similar size (TM=0.21, HE=0.2 
and HD=0.24) compared to the reference group. In other words, to say that “lower castes get 
more children” would not be correct, controlled for other variables. Removing the wealth-
indicator does not change the results. To interpret the results (apart from the Muslims), the 
groups of ethnicity should be split to find out more accurately which groups that are the 
reason for the results. The focus should perhaps be moved towards the reference group. The 
results show that the Terai Ethnic groups get fewer children than most other groups. The Terai 
Ethnic groups consist of over 85 percent Tharu46
The number of siblings 
 people. The result is somewhat surprising, as 
my own impression was that Tharu’s were regarded as one of the groups that actually got 
more children than others. Why these groups get fewer children than other groups is difficult 
to say. Perhaps special programs have been implemented aimed toward particular ethnic 
groups, for instance the Tharu’s.  
The dummy for being from a large family is positive and significant on the 5 percent level.  
This being significant indicates that coming from a large family gives preferences towards 
having a large family yourself. It is not a very large effect, but it indicates that norms and 
traditions affect choices, which is hardly a controversial statement. 
Electricity 
Electricity is also significantly negative. Electricity can work through multiple mechanisms. 
Firstly, it can be an indicator of economic status that is not taken account for through the 
wealth-variables. As well, electricity can say something about the general development level 
in the community and it can have an effect in itself. Women living in households with 
electricity have (depending on the model) 0.1 to 0.15 children less than families without 
electricity.  
                                                 
46 One of the largest ethnic minorities in Nepal. 
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Family Planning and Health Facilities 
The Family Planning variable is significant, but only in Model 3. This is intuitively 
reasonable, as I would expect the impact of family planning initiatives to be more visible for 
families that already have children. As I have already discussed, the selection of regions 
where FPAN is present might not be random, so the variable is not unproblematic. However, 
inhabitants in the FPAN-regions do use more contraception than others (54 percent against 38 
percent). Another point of interest might be that the country average for living in a region 
with at least 6 FPAN projects is at 47 percent, while 80 percent of the Terai Ethnic groups 
lives in such an area. It is difficult to draw conclusion based on these results, but I cannot 
from the data presented reject the possibility that family planning projects can have an effect 
on households’ fertility-choices. 
The distance to health-facilities dummy is not significant in any of the models.    
Other Control Variables 
The regressions in the Appendix 3 show no significant difference between the geographical 
zones and between respondents living in urban or rural areas. There are differences in fertility 
between regions; the survey shows an average total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 in urban regions 
compared to 3.3 in the rural. As well, in the mountain zone, the TFR is 4.1, while being 3.0 in 
the hills and 3.1 in Terai (Ministry of Population and Health [Nepal]:2007a). The difference 
between zones could relate to the fact that in the Mountains and Hills, harder conditions for 
agriculture would lead to higher demand for quantity relative to quality. Apparently, the 
differences between zones and urban/rural is explained by the other variables in my analysis. 
There are probably different educational levels and living standard between geographical 
areas. I would expect that some costs (i.e. housing.) regarding children and family size in the 
city that are not captured by the other variables would show some effect, but they don’t. 
5.2 A Discussion about Causality, Endogeneity and Natural Experiment 
In my main model, endogeneity issues can arise. How is income affected by family-size? Do 
women choose not to get further educated as a consequence of pregnancy? Does a mother lose 
some of her bargaining power (or choose not to use it) if she has many children? The 
causality of most of my variables is uncertain. The sibling dummy cannot be affected by 
fertility, and for the variables regarding the ethnicity and age (but not marriage), the causality 
is clear and work in the direction from the independent variable to number of children. For the 
other significant variables, number of children can have an effect on the independent variable, 
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reversed causality can be present. The problem that might arise is known as simultaneity, the 
dependent variable and the independent variable is jointly determined.  
Education 
This is potentially the variable with highest degree of reversed causality. It is likely to assume 
that women might end their education if they get pregnant. This is, however, not necessarily a 
widespread issue. Some women might also go back to school. Even though the causality 
could work in the opposite direction, I believe that in most cases, level of education is a 
determinant for fertility decisions, not the other way around. 
Wealth 
Decisions that might affect the living standard of the family, including participation in the 
labor market and fertility are probably affected by numerous factors. A family having many 
children might choose to work less than a family with fewer children. However, I find it 
reasonable to assume that families make fertility-decisions based on their income, wealth and 
their own perceptions of the economic consequences of getting children. 
Job/Occupation 
These are not statistically significant anyway, but have basically the same problems as the 
two sets of variables above. 
Female Autonomy  
The measurement of female autonomy is a measurement of the relative power in the 
household. Many children might lead the mother in the family to lose power, for example to 
the mother in law. However, more autonomous women will be more likely to use 
contraception after their desired number of children is met 
In general, the coefficients should be thought of as relationships, and not causes, as the 
causality in some respect is difficult to establish.  
The Gender Variables 
When testing for boy-preference, the problem of endogeneity is absent, because the sex of the 
first child is a natural experiment. The results of this test can be interpreted “without caution”, 
as is not the case of the other results. The causal direction is obvious; Nepalese parents with 
girls as their first born child (ren) want more children because of a preference for sons. 
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5.3 Summary of the Findings 
As the analysis indicates, household wealth is highly correlated with number of children. 
Furthermore, education seems to correlate with fertility although the association here is 
somewhat weaker. One explanation why households with higher wealth tend to get fewer 
children is that they can afford to invest in their children and therefore prefer to have few 
children with high quality and education, rather than many children. This is in accordance 
with theory. The Quality-Quantity Model further emphasizes the opportunity-cost of women 
to get children. The cost for the household to get children is affected by the mother’s wage 
rate. However, almost the entire female workforce in Nepal’s is employed in the agricultural 
sector, and few get higher education.  Thus, the opportunity cost effect is perhaps not very 
relevant. The relatively low effect of women’s higher education is probably due to the limited 
job opportunities for Nepalese women.  
As discussed in both the theoretical and empirical chapters, there are several reasons for why 
women might demand fewer children than their husbands. As observed from the data, 
families with low levels of female autonomy get more children than the others. This is indeed 
an interesting finding, and level of autonomy could be an important alternative to analyzing 
income opportunities, especially in countries where such measures has restricted relevance. 
Furthermore, this pattern indicates that empowering women is an instrument that can be used 
to decrease fertility. 
Evidence from the natural experiment is clear: Nepalese parents have strong gender 
preferences. The underlying motive is related to the household economy, as well as traditions 
and norms. It should be in the interests of policy makers to take the issue seriously, as 
discussed in the next section chapter. 
Another point of interest is the Tharu people.  This group gets significantly fewer children 
than most other ethnic groups in Nepal. Being unable to give a clear-cut answer to this puzzle, 
it remains a highly interesting case. The sibling-dummy indicates that fertility behavior is 
affected partly by norms and traditions, while the family planning variable implies some 
effect of family planning programs although this effect is weak. 
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6. Discussion and Policy Implications 
Further Research 
An interesting question to test more specifically is the effect family planning initiatives have 
on the fertility rate in Nepal. Hania Zlotnik, leader of the UN Population Division, claimed on 
the forum “The World in 2050”, held at Berkeley in January 2009, that most countries have 
experienced a 50 percent decline in the funding to family planning projects47
A more sophisticated analysis of the relationships between fertility behavior, education and 
labor market participation would also be of interest. This could give more insight into the 
relations between men and women’s decisions regarding education, work and family 
formation, including power relations within the households. Especially lack of data on income 
for each household member is a weakness in this thesis. More detailed data would therefore 
enable a more in depth analysis on these questions. Further, the measurement of female 
autonomy can be questioned, and the relationship between female power and the other 
socioeconomic variables are important issues
. This opens up 
for more research, both into the effect of these projects, the consequences of cancelled 
projects and the reason for the drop in funding.  
48
Policy Implications 
. 
According to the last estimates at the CIA World Factbook, the fertility rate in Nepal is down 
to 2.549
The second conclusion regards the preference for sons. In my opinion, this is an issue that has 
to be dealt with and taken seriously. As the fertility rate is declining, more parents want only 
one or two children, thus the gender of the first born child are getting more important. More 
reliable, cheaper and easier-to-use technology for determining the gender of the child is on its 
. This leaves me with two immediate conclusions: The fertility problem in Nepal is 
solved, at least to a certain degree. Karki and Krishna (2008) suggests that the decline can be 
explained by increased contraception use. It is difficult to argue that this is wrong, but I find it 
plausible that increased female autonomy and knowledge regarding reproductive health and 
related issues has accommodated the increased use. 
                                                 
47 Webcast of the Forum found on PRB (2009).  Zlotnik’s comment is about 1 hr 40 min into the first session, 
day 1 (PRB 2009) . 
48 See e.g. Mason (1987) for a discussion about the use of female status in demographic research. 
49 CIA (2010) 
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way 50
Mothers 
.  As long as ultrasound is the only way to find out the gender of the unborn child in 
Nepal, it could be possible to try to regulate the use. However, evidence from India proves 
that ultrasound is frequently used to determine whether the family should keep the child or 
not, and the technology is readily available in most part of the country. This trend is likely to 
move across the border into Nepal at some time or another. The consequences of the rapidly 
declining fertility and the possibility of easily being able to predict the gender of the child has 
consequences, both individually and for the society as a whole. 
They are as mentioned under considerable pressure by their husbands and in-laws to give 
birth to a boy. Abortions are subject to risk and it could be a threat to maternal health. 
Abortion is also often connected with guilt and psychological problems for the mother. The 
existence of products that can determine the gender can of course itself increase the pressure 
on the mother, both from herself and her surroundings. 
Sons 
Indian and Chinese villages filled with bachelors and no brides should be a sufficient sign of 
warning of what might happen when daughters are undesired. Their status above girls is likely 
to be of minor importance for them when they grow up without opportunities to get a wife. 
Daughters 
The girls will probably face serious challenges if they are becoming a minority. Rape and 
prostitution should be natural concerns that increase with a highly biased gender-ratio. 
Significant pressure is probably also put on daughters regarding their marriage.  
Society 
With heaps of frustrated single men without hope of getting a wife; crime rates and alcohol 
and drug usage could be expected to increase51
                                                 
50 Home-test with 80 percent accuracy in the tenth week of pregnancy is available in the west. 
. On the local scale, strange population 
compositions can be the result when large proportions of generations are unable to reproduce. 
However, the fertility rate is still high enough for the problem not to be of great importance, 
and the gender-composition at birth is still normal. Also, the trend seems to be slowly 
changing toward more normal sex-ratios in India and China (Das Gupta et al 2009). Neither 
ultrasound nor other technology is so far accessible to the degree that it should pose a large 
51 A study of the relationship between sex ratios and crime rates in China, found a positive correlation between 
excess of boys and crime (Edlund et al. 2007). 
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threat. As mentioned earlier, the norms are also starting to change, exemplified by former 
Prime Minister Koirala’s funeral, where his daughter lit the funeral pyre. It is important that 
opinion leaders and public figures take action to counter the notion that boys are more 
important than girls. The habit of bringing dowry is a tradition that in my opinion has to be 
questioned. Improving the labor market opportunities, education opportunities and the general 
status of women are slow-running processes that should have focus, both because equal rights 
for women should be implemented for its own sake, and to reduce the chance of a situation 
with a gender biased population.
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire used in Interviews during the fieldwork. 
 CMI-Questionnaire, Fall-2009 
 
Fertility preferences in the Eastern 
Terai VDC-ward: 
 
Date: Name-respondent: 
Caste/ethnic code:___________ 
 
Three largest castes/ethnic groups in VDC, name and code: 
 
A:___________________ B:____________________
 C:____________________ 
 
Minutes of travel to main market (include 
name):______________________________ Mode:_____________ 
Facilities in the village: 
 
Electricity: Bus-service: 
Caste codes: 1=hill B/C, 2=terai-middle/high-caste, 3=hill-janajati, 4=terai-janajati, 5=muslim, 6=hill-
dalit, 7=terai-dalit
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Family members and main occupation during the last 12 months 
Nam
e 
Relatio
n 
Gende
r 
Ag
e 
Complet
ed 
educati
on 
Occupati
on 
Occupati
on code 
Work-
locatio
n 
Househo
ld 
member? 
Daily 
wage 
(incl. 
in-
kind) 
Mont
hly 
sala
ry 
           
           
           
Relation: 1=household-head, 2=wife/husband, 3=children, 
4=grandchildren, 5=parents, 8=siblings 
Education: 1=no schooling, 2=class 1, 3=class 5, 4=class 
9, 5=SLC, 6=intermediate, 7=higher 
Occupation: 1=self employed agriculture, 2=self employed, 
3=daily wage labor agriculture, 4= daily wage labor, 
5=employed private, 6=employed public 
Location: 1=VDC, 2=Morang, 3=Nepal, 4=India, 5=Middle 
East, 6=Malaysia, 7=Other
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Children / marriage 
When you 
decided to 
get your 
last 
child, 
what was 
the reason 
that you 
wanted 
another 
child? 
 
Let us 
repeat, 
how many 
children 
do you 
have? 
 
How many 
more boys 
do you 
want? 
 
Why?  
How many 
more girls 
do you 
want? 
 
Why?  
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In your 
caste how 
many 
children 
is it 
normal to 
have?  
 
Why do you 
want 
more/fewer 
children? 
 
How many 
children 
is it 
normal to 
have for 
other 
castes 
(select 
from page 
1)? 
 
Why 
different 
from your 
caste? 
 
Write any 
other 
important 
comments 
the 
respondent 
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had. 
How many 
children 
did your 
mother 
get? 
 
Why do you 
want more 
/ fewer 
children 
than your 
mother? 
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Family Planning 
 
 
 
Can you 
get advice 
on family 
planning 
in the 
village? 
 
Have you 
received 
advice? 
 
Where?  
Are you 
using 
family 
planning 
methods? 
 
What type?  
If not, 
have you 
used 
before? 
 
Why stop?  
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Plots of land 
Land in 
kattha 
Own the 
plot? 
Main 
crops 
Value/kattha Annual rent if 
rented out,  
or rented in 
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House Circle or write: 
Do you own the house you live 
in?  
Yes - 1 
No - 2 
If no in Q1, what is the housing 
arrangement? 
Rented – 1 
Owned by relatives 
– 2 
Other 
............... 
Type of house wall (main 
material) 
Bamboo & mud – 1 
Wood – 2 
Bricks – 3 
Other:………………………… 
How many floors? Number:………………………. 
Type of house roof Dry grass - 1 
Zinc/Tin - 2 
Tiles – 3 
Other:………………………… 
Other assets 
Asset How many Total sales value 
(Rs) 
Comments 
Motorbike    
Bicycle    
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Television    
He-buffalo    
She-buffalo    
Oxen    
Cows    
Goats    
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Appendix 2: Variable List, Descriptive statistics 
The following variables are used in my analysis. The Dummy=1 column gives the number of 
respondents who belongs to the corresponding group.      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Dummy=1 Description 
childvar 8693 2.68768 1.845601 0 12  
Number of born children that are 
either alive or have survived his 
or hers fifth birthday 
childvar_1 7731 3.022119 1.679078 1 12  Childvar>0 
childvar_2 6266 3.494893 1.516198 2 12  Childvar>1 
        
age 8693 31.11757 9.098833 15 49  Respondents Age 
age2 8693 1051.082 591.7531 225 2401  Age squared 
mardur52 8640 13.83542 9.352482 0 39  Duration of current marriage 
mardur2 8640 278.8775 302.6216 0 1521  Mardur squared 
        
Poorest* 8693 .2138502 .4100459 0 1 1,859 Belongs to the poorest quintile based on the wealth indicator. 
poorer 8693 .1924537 .3942501 0 1 1,673 Poorer quintile 
middle 8693 .1876222 .3904327 0 1 1,631 Middle quintile 
richer 8693 .2030369 .4022829 0 1 1,765 Richer quintile 
richest 8693 .2030369 .4022829 0 1 1,765 Richest quintile 
electricity53 8211 .4987212 .5000288 0 1 4,095 Respondent has electricity 
        
edu0* 8693 .6215346 .4850324 0 1 5,403 Respondent has no education 
edu00 8693 .1175659 .3221119 0 1 1,022 Respondent has no education, but is not illiterate. 
edu1 8693 .1700219 .3756736 0 1 1,478 Primary education 
edu2 8693 .1800299 .3842345 0 1 1,565 Secondary education 
edu3 8693 .0284137 .1661611 0 1 247 Higher education 
hedu0* 8693 .2483608 .432087 0 1 2,159 H=husband 
hedu1 8693 .2711377 .4445726 0 1 2,357  
hedu2 8693 .3854826 .4867371 0 1 3,351  
hedu3 8693 .0903025 .2866312 0 1 785  
        
serv 8693 .0796043 .2706952 0 1 692 Respondent works in service sector 
                                                 
52 53 respondents are married, but have not performed gupta; moved into their husbands family. 
53 576 respondents are not de jure residents in the household 
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Agri* 8693 .7308179 .4435603 0 1 6,353 Agricultural sector 
nowork 8693 .1613942 .3679153 0 1 1,400 Has no work 
indust 8693 .0276084 .1638575 0 1 240 Industrial sector 
notspec 8693 .0005752 .0239773 0 1 5 Job not specified 
hserv54 8665  .3431044 .4747734 0 1 2,973 H=husband 
Hagri* 8665 .4060012 .4911131 0 1 3,518  
hindust 8665 .2208886 .4148695 0 1 1,914  
hnotspec 8665 .0214657 .144939 0 1 186  
hnowork 8665 .0085401 .0920225 0 1 74  
        
Husbsay* 8693 .3178419 .4656645 0 1 2,763 Husband has last say on visits to family and relatives 
elsesay 8693 .2078684 .4058055 0 1 1,807 Someone else has last say 
jointsay 8693 .245945 .4306709 0 1 2,138 Husband and respondent has last say 
respsay 8693 .2276544 .4193425 0 1 1,979 Respondent has last say 
        
Hill* 8693 .383527 .4862728 0 1 3,334 Lives in the hill zone 
Terai 8693 .4830323 .4997408 0 1 4,199 Terai 
Mountain* 8693 .1334407 .34007 0 1 1,160 Mountain 
Rural 8693 .7363396 .4406426 0 1 6,401 Lives in urban area 
Urban* 8693 .2636604 .4406426 0 1 2,292 Rural area 
        
BC 8693 .3627056 .4808085 0 1 3,153 Brahmin/Chetri 
HD 8693 .0924882 .2897306 0 1 804 Hill Dalit 
TE* 8693 .1103186 .3133045 0 1 959 Terai Ethnic 
HE 8693 .2367422 .4251072 0 1 2,058 Hill Ethnic 
TD 8693 .0399172 .1957759 0 1 347 Terai Dalit 
MS 8693 .0331301 .1789866 0 1 288 Muslim 
TM 8693 .1167606 .3211533 0 1 1,015 Terai Middle 
        
projectdummy 8693 .4663522 .4988952 0 1 4,054 
Respondent lives in a district with 
more than 5 FPAN projects in 
2008 
healthfac 8693 .403313 .4905908 0 1 3,506 
Respondent states that distance to 
health facility is a “big problem” 
when getting medical help for 
herself. 
sibdummy 8693 .4270102 .4946723 0 1 3,712 Respondent has more than 4 siblings 
        
                                                 
54 28 missing observations. Unknown reason, probably not reported for some of the respondents who has not 
performed gupta.  
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firstboy 8693 .4505924 .4975815 0 1 3,917 First born child is boy 
firstgirl 8693 .4456459 .4970654 0 1 3,874 First born child is girl 
boydummy 8693 .1881974 .3908922 0 1 1,636 Two first born children are boys 
girldummy 8693 .1810652 .3850944 0 1 1,574 Two first born children are girls 
oneofeach 8693 .6307374 .4826329 0 1 5,483 Two first born children are one girl and one boy. 
 
*= Reference group (Only the Terai zone is included in the Analysis, so people living in Hills 
or Mountain is the reference group) 
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Appendix 3:The Regression Models 
 
Appendix 3 a: The OLS-Models 
 Whole Sample At least one child sample At least two children sample 
VARIABLES (OLS, Model-1) (OLS, Model-2) (OLS, Model-3) 
firstgirl  0.314***  
  (0.0350)  
oneofeach   0.269*** 
   (0.0435) 
girldummy   0.711*** 
   (0.0491) 
age 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0279) (0.0311) 
age2 -0.00185*** -0.00164*** -0.00155*** 
 (0.000422) (0.000461) (0.000480) 
mardur 0.205*** 0.156*** 0.0963*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0156) 
mardur2 -0.00227*** -0.00138*** -0.000114 
 (0.000390) (0.000434) (0.000455) 
poorer -0.182*** -0.205*** -0.222*** 
 (0.0691) (0.0679) (0.0783) 
middle -0.300*** -0.344*** -0.341*** 
 (0.0737) (0.0804) (0.0841) 
richer -0.350*** -0.394*** -0.386*** 
 (0.0778) (0.0837) (0.0893) 
richest -0.478*** -0.509*** -0.506*** 
 (0.0943) (0.0999) (0.0974) 
electricity -0.129** -0.101* -0.143** 
 (0.0521) (0.0561) (0.0558) 
edu00 -0.218*** -0.220*** -0.223*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0459) (0.0446) 
edu1 -0.159*** -0.179*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0465) (0.0484) 
edu2 -0.0466 -0.136** -0.169*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0553) (0.0613) 
edu3 -0.0480 -0.177* -0.277** 
 (0.0922) (0.0971) (0.118) 
hedu1 0.0283 0.0143 0.000978 
 (0.0551) (0.0528) (0.0488) 
hedu2 -0.0560 -0.0931* -0.124** 
 (0.0460) (0.0483) (0.0478) 
hedu3 -0.209*** -0.296*** -0.417*** 
 (0.0675) (0.0709) (0.0717) 
serv -0.173** -0.179** -0.117* 
 (0.0690) (0.0725) (0.0679) 
nowork 0.00246 -0.0141 0.00801 
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 (0.0460) (0.0464) (0.0544) 
indust -0.0467 -0.0298 -0.0339 
 (0.123) (0.130) (0.147) 
notspec 0.0337 -0.119 -0.245* 
 (0.141) (0.128) (0.125) 
hserv 0.0192 0.0113 -0.00387 
 (0.0451) (0.0458) (0.0488) 
hnowork -0.301** -0.430** -0.576** 
 (0.148) (0.200) (0.266) 
hindust 0.0126 -0.0171 -0.0759 
 (0.0440) (0.0458) (0.0483) 
hnotspec -0.0525 0.00162 -0.0287 
 (0.105) (0.101) (0.114) 
elsesay -0.259*** -0.252*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0453) (0.0497) 
jointsay -0.0504 -0.0881* -0.148*** 
 (0.0531) (0.0513) (0.0528) 
respsay -0.215*** -0.248*** -0.239*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0548) 
terai 0.0247 0.0660 0.0356 
 (0.0790) (0.0795) (0.0811) 
rural 0.0553 0.0330 -0.00348 
 (0.0507) (0.0525) (0.0504) 
BC 0.0120 0.0366 0.0571 
 (0.0927) (0.0922) (0.0903) 
HD 0.161 0.191* 0.243** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.109) 
HE 0.0940 0.111 0.195** 
 (0.0951) (0.0941) (0.0967) 
TD 0.0346 0.0186 0.0140 
 (0.0984) (0.102) (0.110) 
MS 0.482*** 0.545*** 0.591*** 
 (0.136) (0.151) (0.157) 
TM 0.127 0.181** 0.211*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0787) (0.0798) 
projectdummy -0.0434 -0.0678 -0.111* 
 (0.0583) (0.0589) (0.0583) 
healthfac 0.0643 0.0606 0.0431 
 (0.0414) (0.0426) (0.0494) 
sibdummy 0.0657** 0.0621** 0.0815** 
 (0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0328) 
Constant -0.736** -0.451 0.0798 
 (0.322) (0.366) (0.447) 
    
Observations 8,140 7,412 6,083 
R-squared 0.546 0.502 0.424 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 3 b: The Poisson Models 
 
 Whole Sample At least one 
child sample 
At least two 
children 
sample 
VARIABLES (Poisson, 
Model-1) 
(Poisson, 
Model-2) 
(Poisson, 
Model-3) 
firstgirl  1.107***  
  (0.0122)  
oneofeach   1.085*** 
   (0.0146) 
girldummy   1.222*** 
   (0.0174) 
age 1.049*** 1.041*** 1.036*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.00943) 
age2 0.999*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000157) (0.000151) (0.000132) 
mardur 1.127*** 1.082*** 1.043*** 
 (0.00649) (0.00559) (0.00487) 
mardur2 0.998*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000150) (0.000143) (0.000121) 
poorer 0.939*** 0.938*** 0.944*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0184) (0.0187) 
middle 0.906*** 0.900*** 0.914*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.0194) 
richer 0.888*** 0.886*** 0.903*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0227) (0.0204) 
richest 0.857*** 0.852*** 0.870*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0282) (0.0226) 
electricity 0.954** 0.967* 0.960** 
 (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0152) 
edu00 0.935*** 0.937*** 0.940*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0138) (0.0121) 
edu1 0.947*** 0.942*** 0.935*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0167) (0.0144) 
edu2 0.950** 0.920*** 0.929*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0215) (0.0186) 
edu3 0.869*** 0.848*** 0.865*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0316) (0.0313) 
hedu1 1.013 1.009 1.004 
 (0.0174) (0.0154) (0.0125) 
hedu2 0.987 0.978 0.969** 
 (0.0156) (0.0144) (0.0123) 
hedu3 0.919*** 0.898*** 0.879*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0236) (0.0194) 
serv 0.945** 0.942** 0.964* 
 (0.0266) (0.0251) (0.0202) 
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nowork 1.018 1.003 1.007 
 (0.0197) (0.0170) (0.0168) 
indust 0.982 0.991 0.983 
 (0.0489) (0.0457) (0.0438) 
notspec 1.027 0.977 0.915** 
 (0.0499) (0.0469) (0.0335) 
hserv 1.016 1.009 1.001 
 (0.0170) (0.0151) (0.0138) 
hnowork 0.831** 0.864** 0.868* 
 (0.0648) (0.0596) (0.0636) 
hindust 1.013 0.997 0.980 
 (0.0168) (0.0149) (0.0135) 
hnotspec 1.009 1.014 0.999 
 (0.0459) (0.0398) (0.0359) 
elsesay 0.895*** 0.915*** 0.957*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0144) (0.0140) 
jointsay 0.979 0.970* 0.960*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0149) (0.0135) 
respsay 0.936*** 0.929*** 0.936*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0140) 
terai 1.005 1.023 0.998 
 (0.0303) (0.0281) (0.0171) 
rural 1.027 1.011 0.999 
 (0.0208) (0.0194) (0.0152) 
BC 1.009 1.016 1.014 
 (0.0365) (0.0317) (0.0247) 
HD 1.058 1.064* 1.067** 
 (0.0415) (0.0362) (0.0305) 
HE 1.029 1.034 1.051* 
 (0.0382) (0.0329) (0.0264) 
TD 1.006 1.005 1.008 
 (0.0380) (0.0343) (0.0323) 
MS 1.191*** 1.187*** 1.174*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0483) (0.0476) 
TM 1.053* 1.063** 1.066*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0257) (0.0231) 
projectdummy 0.985 0.977 0.973** 
 (0.0203) (0.0186) (0.0132) 
healthfac 1.020 1.019 1.013 
 (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0137) 
sibdummy 1.031*** 1.026*** 1.027*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00953) (0.00965) 
Constant 0.437*** 0.683*** 1.079 
 (0.0694) (0.0959) (0.145) 
    
Observations 8,140 7,412 6,083 
seEform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 3 c: Pseudo R-squared for the Poisson Regression55
 
  
Model Mc Fadden’s Pseuso 
R2 
Poisson-1 0.1837 
Poisson-2 0.1320 
Poisson-3 0.0782 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 From Poisson regressions without the survey-command, as Pseudo-R2 is not reported with the survey-
command. 
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Appendix 3 d: The Negative Binomial Regression56
 
 
 At least two 
children samlple 
alpha 
VARIABLES (Negative  
Binomial, 
Model -3) 
(Dispersion 
Parameter) 
   
oneofeach 1.086***  
 (0.0189)  
girldummy 1.227***  
 (0.0238)  
age 1.029*  
 (0.0155)  
age2 1.000*  
 (0.000206)  
mardur 1.048***  
 (0.00833)  
mardur2 0.999***  
 (0.000186)  
poorer 0.942***  
 (0.0205)  
middle 0.908***  
 (0.0223)  
richer 0.897***  
 (0.0253)  
richest 0.850***  
 (0.0299)  
electricity 0.960**  
 (0.0194)  
edu00 0.940***  
 (0.0210)  
edu1 0.950**  
 (0.0221)  
edu2 0.943*  
 (0.0284)  
edu3 0.895  
 (0.0679)  
hedu1 1.005  
 (0.0178)  
hedu2 0.970  
 (0.0196)  
hedu3 0.911**  
 (0.0353)  
serv 0.958  
                                                 
56 This analysis is done without the survey-command.  
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 (0.0298)  
nowork 0.993  
 (0.0254)  
indust 0.991  
 (0.0433)  
notspec 0.913  
 (0.291)  
hserv 0.995  
 (0.0190)  
hnowork 0.889  
 (0.0861)  
hindust 0.987  
 (0.0196)  
hnotspec 0.992  
 (0.0575)  
elsesay 0.966  
 (0.0248)  
jointsay 0.971  
 (0.0179)  
respsay 0.940***  
 (0.0194)  
mountain 0.996  
 (0.0219)  
rural 0.993  
 (0.0191)  
BC 1.010  
 (0.0254)  
HD 1.051  
 (0.0331)  
HE 1.037  
 (0.0275)  
TD 0.993  
 (0.0402)  
MS 1.172***  
 (0.0496)  
TM 1.062**  
 (0.0308)  
projectdummy 0.982  
 (0.0160)  
healthfac 1.024  
 (0.0155)  
sibdummy 1.024*  
 (0.0142)  
Constant 1.154 1.22e-60 
 (0.252) (0) 
   
Observations 6,083 6,083 
seEform in arentheses 
 89 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 0.0057
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57  The test shoes that the null that the variance equals the mean cannot be rejected. 
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Appendix 4: Wald Tests of difference between dummies of difference 
 
test poorer=middle 
( 1)  poorer - middle = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    4.37 
Prob > F =    0.0383** 
 
test poorer=richer 
( 1)  poorer - richer= 0 
F(  1,   143) =  5.98 
Prob > F = 0.0157 
Prob > F =    0.4143 
 
test richer=richest 
( 1)  richer - richest = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    4.88 
Prob > F =    0.0287** 
 
test middle=richest 
( 1)  middle - richest = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    6.96 
Prob > F =    0.0093*** 
 
test edu00=edu1 
( 1)  edu00 - edu1 = 0 
F(  1,   143) = 0.00 
Prob > F = 0.9741 
 
test edu00=edu2 
( 1)  edu00 - edu2 = 0 
F(  1,   143) = 0.71 
Prob > F = 0.4010 
 
test edu00=edu3 
( 1)  edu00 - edu3 = 0 
F(  1,   143) = 0.19 
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Prob > F = 0.6604 
 
test edu1=edu2 
( 1)  edu1 - edu2 = 0 
F(  1,   143) = 0.95 
Prob > F = 0.3320 
 
test edu2=edu3 
( 1)  edu2 - edu3 = 0 
F(  1,   143) = 1.09 
Prob > F = 0.2972 
 
test serv=indust 
( 1)  serv - indust = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    0.93 
Prob > F =    0.3360 
 
test nowork=serv 
( 1)  - serv + nowork = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    4.55 
Prob > F =    0.0347** 
 
test MS=BC 
( 1)  - BC + MS = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    12.07 
Prob > F =    0.007*** 
 
test MS=HD 
( 1)  - HD + MS = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    4.27 
Prob > F =    0.0314** 
 
test MS=HE 
( 1)  - HE + MS = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    6.70 
Prob > F =    0.0106** 
 
test MS=TD 
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( 1)  - TD + MS = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    10.03 
Prob > F =    0.0019*** 
 
test MS=TM 
( 1)  MS - TM = 0 
F(  1,   143) =    5.91 
Prob > F =    0.0163** 
 
test respsay=elsesay 
( 1)  - elsesay + respsay 
= 0 
F(  1,   143) =    2.60 
Prob > F =    0.1090 
 
test respsay=jointsay 
( 1)  - jointsay + respsay 
= 0 
F(  1,   143) =    2.94 
Prob > F =    0.0887* 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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